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of-use#LAAINFORMATIONAL REGULATION AND INFORMATIONAL
STANDING: AKINS AND BEYOND
CASS R. SUNSTEINt
As  Government programs  and policies become  more complex  and far reach-
ing, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not
have  clear analogs in our common-law tradition ....  In  my view, Congress
has the power to define injuries  and articulate chains of causation that will give
rise to a case or controversy where none existed before .... 1
If today's decision  is correct, it  is within  the power of Congress to  authorize
any interested person to manage (through the courts) the Executive's enforce-
ment of any law that includes  a requirement for the filing and public availabil-
ity of a piece of  paper.
2
INTRODUCTION
It is often said that the American economy has been shifting from one
based on industrial development to  one based on the creation  and dissemi-
nation of information. 3  Whether or not this is so, there can be little doubt
that a number of statutes in the last forty years were designed to ensure  dis-
closure  of information,  and  that  mandatory  disclosure  is  an  increasingly
pervasive and important regulatory tool.  Indeed, informational  regulation,
or regulation through disclosure, has become one of the most  striking de-
velopments in the last generation of American law.4
t  Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service  Professor, University of Chicago Law School
and Department of Political Science.  I am grateful to Jack Goldsmith and Richard Posner for
valuable comments on a previous draft.
I Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,  504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992)  (Kennedy,  J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
2 Federal  Election Comm'n v. Akins,  118 S. Ct.  1777,  1792 (1998)  (Scalia, J.,  dissent- ing).
i  See, e.g.,  DAVID  OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER,  REINVENTING GOVERNMENT:  How THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL  SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC  SECTOR  15-16  (1992)  (describing
the failure of government bureaucracy to adjust to the new "knowledge-based  economy").
4 See STEPHEN BREYER,  REGULATION AND ITS REFORM  171-75 (1982)  (discussing alter-
natives  to  classical  regulation  that  overcome  some of the  information  problems  associated
with regulation);  WESLEY A. MAGAT  & W. KIP Viscusi, INFORMATIONAL  APPROACHES  TO
REGULATION  (1992)  (discussing,  in depth,  various informational  approaches  to regulation);
ANTHONY  OGUS,  REGULATION:  LEGAL  FORM  AND  ECONOMIC  THEORY  121-49  (1994)
(identifying  "mandatory  disclosure"  and "control  of false or misleading  information"  as the
two broad  categories of information  regulation,  and  discussing the justifications  for  each);
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Informational  regulation  takes several  different forms.  Sometimes the
government attempts to improve the behavior of private industry by requir-
ing  companies  to  disclose  information  about,  for example,  toxic  releases,
the contents of food and drink, and workplace injuries.  Prominent examples
include the Emergency  Planning and Community Right-to-Know  Acte  and
6 regulations  governing  the  disclosure  of the  nutritional  content  of food.
Here the goal is to fortify either market mechanisms  or political  checks on
private  behavior.7  Sometimes  the government  attempts  to control  its own
agents through compulsory production  and disclosure of information;  con-
sider the National Environmental  Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),8 the Free-
dom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 9 and the Federal Election Campaign Act
("FECA").1 0  Here the goal is to allow more in the way of public monitoring
of governmental  decisions,  with  particular  issues  (insufficient  environ-
mental  concern,  unlawful  behavior during  campaigns,  official  corruption)
receiving special attention.
Legal struggles between those seeking information on the one hand, and
government or others required  by law to disclose  information on the other,
Paul  R. Kleindorfer  &  Eric W.  Orts, Informational  Regulation of Environmental  Risks,  18
RISK  ANALYSIS  155 (1998)  (examining the  informational  regulation  of environmental  risks
from  an economic perspective);  Eric W.  Orts, Reflexive  Environmental Law, 89 NW.  U.  L.
REV.  1227,  1258-64,  1313-40  (1995)  (advancing  "reflexive  law"  as a  means of regulating
complex societies by adopting procedures rather than "detailed pronouncements  of  acceptable
behavior,"  and  advocating  mandatory  environmental  audits  as  a type of reflexive  environ-
mental law).
5 42  U.S.C.  §§  11,001-50  (1994)  (establishing  notification  and reporting  requirements
relating to hazardous chemicals).
6 See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535,  104 Stat. 2353
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343  (1994)).  The most important provisions of this Act
are codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(r).
7  Throughout this Article,  a reference to the "goals"  or "purposes"  of a statute requiring
disclosure is designed not to capture the actual  political  forces that give  rise to the  law, but
instead to put the  law in a sympathetic  light and to make the best sense of it.  Undoubtedly,
statutes that require disclosure-like all statutes-owe a great deal to interest group pressures,
some of them pernicious.  The existence of informational regulation rather than more aggres-
sive controls  may reflect  the power of self-interested  private groups attempting to minimize
government's presence  in their lives.  So, too, the existence  of informational  regulation may
reflect  the  efforts of self-interested,  entrepreneurial  groups.  Both of these possibilities  are
connected to the risk that informational  regulation will be futile or excessively expensive.
8 42 U.S.C.  §§ 4321-4370d  (1994)  (establishing  the  Council  on  Environmental  Quality
and related  federal environmental  departments  to carry out  research  and reporting  responsi-
bilities).
9  5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994  & Supp. III  1997) (requiring agencies  to publish public informa-
tion in the Federal  Register  and to make nonpublished materials available to persons who re-
quest them).
10  2 U.S.C.  §§ 431-56 (1994 & Supp. III  1997)  (requiring candidates for federal office to
disclose certain types of campaign contributions).
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promise to provide many of the most important public law cases in the next
several decades.  The outcome of these  struggles will have significant con-
sequences.  Victories  for those who seek to withhold  information  are  im-
portant not only because they dispose of the case at hand, but also because
they give similarly situated people, in both government and the private sec-
tor, a clear signal about whether they must disclose information  outside of
the context  of litigated  cases.  This  signal  will  inevitably  affect  behavior
well before cases arise.
For many years  it has been unclear  whether, and  under what circum-
stances, a citizen will have standing in federal court to seek access to infor-
mation held by the government.  FOIA gives  standing to all persons to ob-
tain  a  wide  range  of  information;1  there  is  no  requirement  that  the
information  involve a particular citizen, or even be shown to be relevant to
her professional or personal concerns.  Mere curiosity appears to be enough.
Anyone is entitled to obtain any information that FOIA makes public.' 2  Is
FOIA therefore unconstitutional?  NEPA requires the government to  com-
pile  and  disclose  environmentally  relevant  information  before  it proceeds
with projects  having a major impact  on the environment. 1 3  But who, ex-
actly, may sue to require preparation  of an environmental  impact statement
("EIS")?  Is curiosity enough here as well?  FECA imposes a wide range of
reporting and disclosure requirements on all "political committees." 14  Does
this  mean  that any  American  can  bring  suit  against  the Federal  Election
Commission ("FEC") to require it to enforce the law?
11  See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (requiring agencies  to make  certain information  available to the
public).
12  In Akins v. Federal Election  Comm'n,  101  F.3d 731  (D.C.  Cir. 1996) (en banc),  va-
cated, 118  S. Ct.  1777 (1998),  the court  gave the closest thing to an explanation of the  pre-
vailing view:
Congress  can  create a legal  right  (and,  typically,  a cause of action to protect  that
right) the interference with which will create  an Article III injury.  Such a legal right
can be given to all persons in the country.  In that event, any person whose individ-
ual right has been  frustrated or interfered with has standing  to sue, even though  all
other persons have the same right, without the claim being regarded as a generalized
grievance.  That is why anyone denied information  under the Freedom  of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) has standing to sue regardless of his or her reasons for suing.
Id.  at 736 (citations omitted).
13  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d.  Specifically,  42 U.S.C.  § 4332 provides that "all  agencies
of the  Federal Government shall...  include in every recommendation  or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions  significantly affecting the quality  of the human
environment, a detailed statement...  on (i) the environmental  impact of the proposed action."
14  2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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The  Supreme  Court has now  started  to  sort out  this  area of the  law.
Federal  Election Commission v. Akins 15 is  by far the most important pro-
nouncement  on the general  issue of standing to obtain information.  More
than that, it reorients the general law of standing in several significant ways.
In particular, the Court appears to have held that any citizen has standing to
sue under FECA; that Congress  is permitted to grant standing to all or many
citizens,  even if they are  seeking to redress a "generalized  grievance";  that
the key question,  in cases  involving information  or  anything else,  is what
the relevant  source of law actually  says; and that Article  II is  no barrier to
suits brought by citizens whose interests are not substantially different from
those of the citizenry  as a whole.16  The most important step here is the sug-
gestion that Congress can overcome the barrier to "generalized grievances,"
for this barrier is likely to be crucial to plaintiffs seeking information.
At the same time, the  Court's opinion marks  a significant new  devel-
opment in the law of "redressability,"  a development that is in considerable
tension with previous cases.  And the Court's opinion raises or leaves  open
a host of new questions about the circumstances in which citizens may bring
suits to obtain information.  It is no wonder that Justice Scalia wrote a pas-
sionate dissent, suggesting that the Court's opinion violates not only Article
III but Article II as well. 17
Remarkably, the  emerging  law governing  standing  to obtain  informa-
tion has yet to receive academic attention.  The basic purpose of this Article
is to begin to fill this gap,  above all by exploring the intersection between
the law of standing and the wide range of statutes mandating public disclo-
sure.  In the process  it will  be necessary  to offer  an understanding  of the
extent to which  disclosure of information has become a central  part of the
American regulatory  state-as central,  in its  way, as  command-and-control
regulation and economic incentives.  As we shall see,  it is impossible to un-
derstand the standing questions without understanding the regulatory  ques-
tions as well.  As we shall also see, an understanding of the emerging law of
standing  to  receive  information  has  a  set  of implications  for the  law  of
standing in general.
The  Supreme Court's decision  in Akins is the vehicle for much of the
analysis, because the Akins Court covers a strikingly wide range of standing
issues, in a way that is full of implications for the future.  My most general
claim  is that  at least  in information  cases,  the  question of standing  is for
15  118  S. Ct. 1777 (1998).
16  See infra Part II (discussing the Court's holding and analysis in Akins).
17  See Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1789-92  (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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congressional  rather than judicial resolution.  It follows that whether some-
one has informational  standing depends on what Congress has said.  If
Congress  creates a legal right to information and gives people the authority
to vindicate that right in court, the standing question is essentially resolved.
Insofar as  it recognizes  this  point, Akins appears  to  vindicate  the passage
from Justice Kennedy's important concurring opinion in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, quoted above,18 and in the process suggests that Justice Scalia's
prophecy, also quoted above,
19 will eventually be proved correct.
This Article comes in four parts.  Part I discusses the use of information
as a regulatory tool, partly as a background for the question of standing, and
partly  as  a brief, freestanding  treatment  of an  important  development  in
regulatory law.  The basic point here is that informational strategies are dis-
placing  (and  have  significant  advantages  over)  command-and-control  ap-
proaches.  In some contexts, however, they risk futility and excessive cost,
partly  because  of the  difficulty  that  people  face  in  dealing  with  low-
probability events.
Part II deals with Akins itself and outlines the several clarifications  of,
and departures from,  current law.  The argument here is that the Court has
revised the "injury in fact" test so as to focus attention on what kind of harm
Congress sought to prevent;  in the process the Court has made clear, for the
first time, that Congress  can grant standing to someone  who suffers a quite
generalized  injury.  Part III evaluates the Akins Court's approach to  infor-
mational  standing,  with  particular  emphasis  on  the  relationships  among
standing,  injury in fact, congressional  instructions, and Article III.  I argue
that  the  Court's  decision  suggests  the  right  approach  for  informational
standing,  but that the  decision  leaves  open  a  number  of questions,  both
practical and conceptual.
Part IV discusses  the future, with reference to  a number of actual  and
hypothetical  cases.  I  attempt  to  show how an  understanding  of informa-
tional regulation  sheds light on the question of informational  standing.  The
most important claim is that if Congress creates  an interest in receiving in-
formation, and gives people a right to vindicate that interest in court, then it
has acted consistently with Article III.  This claim  bears in turn on the gen-
eral law of standing and the whole notion of "injury in fact," especially, but
not only, in the context of information.  It suggests that whether there is  an
18 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992)  (Kennedy, J.,  concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment); see supra  text accompanying note 1.
See supra  text accompanying note 2.
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"injury"  cannot  be  decided  in  the  abstract,  or  solely by  reference  to  the
"facts";  it turns instead on positive law.
I.  INFORMATION AS A REGULATORY  TOOL
In this Part I deal with the rise of informational  regulation.  At least a
general  understanding  of this  development  is a prerequisite  for  an under-
standing of informational  standing.  In addition,  it is  worthwhile to have a
sense  of this important  development  in the fabric of the modem regulatory
state,  a development  that promises  to  become  all the  more  central  in the
coming decade, when there will likely be a great deal of experimentation in
this direction.
2 0
A.  An Overview
Informational regulation is far from new to American  law.  At common
law, sellers of goods and services face certain obligations of disclosure; thus
a failure  to convey  relevant  information  may violate  the  common  law  of
21 contract or tort.  The New Deal, of course, witnessed a dramatic shift from
regulation  through  common  law  courts  to  regulation  via  administrative
agencies, 22  and  disclosure  of information  became  a  pervasive  regulatory
strategy,  most obviously through  the work of the  Securities  and Exchange
Commission.
23  But the great modem  surge  of informational  regulation-
20  This  is  a bipartisan view.  See NEWT GINGRICH  ET  AL.,  CONTRACT  WITH  AMERICA
131-35  (1994)  (discussing  reforms  that would,  inter alia,  increase  information);  AL  GORE,
COMMON  SENSE  GOvERNMENT:  WORKS  BETTER AND  COSTS LESS  (1996)  (discussing the
Clinton  Administration's  efforts to restructure the  federal  government  to increase  flexibility
and reduce rigid regulation).
21  See  McMahon  v. Bunn-O-Matic  Corp.,  150 F.3d 651,  655-56  (7th  Cir.  1998)  (sug-
gesting that there  may be circumstances  under which manufacturers  must warn consumers
"about a surprising feature that is potentially dangerous yet hard to observe,"  but holding that
a coffee manufacturer did not have to provide a detailed  warning about the severity of bums
potentially  caused by  hot liquid);  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TORTS:  PRODUCTS  LiABILiTY
§ 2  (1998)  ("A  product...  (c)  is  defective  because of inadequate  instructions  or  warnings
when the foreseeable  risks of harm...  could  have been reduced or  avoided by the provision
of reasonable  instructions  or warnings ...  and  the omission  of the  instructions  or warnings
renders the product not reasonably  safe.");  WILLIAM L.  PROSSER,  HANDBOOK  OF THE  LAW
OF TORTS  641-82 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing products liability).
22  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION  11-46 (1990)  (describing the
displacement of  the common law by regulatory programs).
23  See Securities  Act of 1933,  15 U.S.C. § 77h, j (1994  & Supp. III  1997)  (establishing
disclosure  requirements  for  offerings  of securities);  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934,  15
U.S.C.  § 78a-1 1 (1994 & Supp. 11  1997) (establishing the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and providing for regulation of securities transactions  and exchanges).
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growing  out  of laws  involving health,  safety,  and  the  environment-is  a
post-1960s  phenomenon.  Mandatory  disclosure  was  a  central part  of the
rights  revolution  of the  1960s  and  1970s,  and  it has  become  especially
prominent  in the  1980s and  1990s,  largely  as  an alternative  to  command-
and-control regulation.
24
Many  statutes  and regulations  now require  the  disclosure  or even the
production  of information.  Some of these are designed to assist consumers
in  making  informed  choices;  such  statutes  are  meant  to  be  market-
enhancing.  By contrast, others are designed to trigger political, rather than
market,  safeguards;  such  statutes  are  meant to  enhance  democratic  proc-
esses.  Of course there is an overlap between the two categories.  A statute
that requires companies to place "eco-labels"  on their products may produce
little in the way of consumer  response, but shareholders  and participants in
the democratic  process may attempt to punish those whose labels reveal en-
vironmentally  destructive behavior.  Companies will know this in advance,
with likely behavioral consequences.  The risk of sanctions from sharehold-
ers  and  state  legislatures  may  well  produce  environmental  improvement
even without regulation.
25
Heavily publicized health risks from tobacco represent the most promi-
nent forerunners  of more recent measures that attempt to fortify the opera-
tions of markets by informing consumers.  Thus, mandatory messages about
the dangers of cigarette smoking, first set out in 1965 and modified  in 1969
and 1984,  are, of course,  designed to ensure that smokers are  aware of the
associated  risks.26  The Food  and Drug Administration  ("FDA")  has long
maintained  a policy of requiring risk labels for  pharmaceutical  products.27
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has done the same for pes-
ticides  and asbestos.28  Congress  itself requires  warnings  on products that
24  See  the  discussion  of informational  strategies  in  ROBERT  V.  PERCIVAL Er  AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATION:  LAW,  SCIENCE,  AND POLICY 612-27 (2d ed. 1996).
25  Consider  the  eco-label  required  by  the  European  Union.  See  Council  Regulation
880/92 of 23 March 1992 on a Community Eco-Label Award Scheme,  1992 O.J. (L99) 1. See
generally Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 4.
26  See  Comprehensive  Smoking  Education Act  of 1984,  Pub.  L. No.  98-474,  98  Stat.
2204  (codified as  amended  at 15  U.S.C.  §§  1331-41  (1994))  (requiring  multiple  warnings
about  the health  risks  associated  with  smoking);  Public Health  Cigarette  Smoking  Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222,  84 Stat. 87 (1970)  (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.  §§  1331-41
(1994))  (same); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92,
79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341  (1994))  (same).
27  See 21 C.F.R  § 201.57 (1998)  (stating labeling requirements  for prescription drugs and
insulin).
28  See 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997) (referring to environmental pesticide
regulations); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1994)  (listing EPA regulations that require warning labels
for products  containing  polychlorinated  biphenyls  ("PCBs"),  asbestos,  or hexavalent  chro-
mium,  a water treatment  chemical, promulgated  under the federal  Toxic Substances Control
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contain  saccharin.29   There  are  numerous  other  illustrations,  but  several
post-1980 initiatives are especially striking and deserve brief description  by
way of illustration and for purposes of understanding the standing question.
In 1983,  the Occupational  Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA")
issued a Hazard Communication Standard ("HCS"), applicable to the manu-
facturing sector.30  In 1986, the HCS was made generally  applicable.31  Un-
der the HCS, chemical producers and importers must evaluate the hazards of
the chemicals they produce or import; develop technical hazard information
for material  safety  data  sheets,  and labels  for  hazardous  substances;  and,
most  importantly,  transmit  this  information  to  users  of the relevant  sub-
stances.  All employers must adopt a hazard communication program-one
that  includes  individual  training-and  inform  workers  of  the  relevant
risks.32
The FDA has  also adopted  informational  strategies.  In its  most ambi-
tious  set of proposals,  the FDA required a form of disclosure that affected
nearly  all  food  and drink  purchased  in  the United  States.  The  FDA  (1)
compelled nutritional  labeling  on nearly all processed  foods,  including  in-
formation  relating to cholesterol,  saturated fat,  calories from fat,  and fiber;
(2) required  compliance  with government-specified  serving  sizes; (3) com-
pelled  companies  to  conform  to  government  definitions  of standardized
terms,  including,  "reduced,"  "fresh,"  "free,"  and  "low";  and  (4)  allowed
health claims  only if  the claims (a) are supported by scientific evidence  and
(b)  communicate  clear and complete  information about such matters as  fat
and heart disease,  fat and cancer, sodium  and high blood pressure, and cal-
cium and osteoporosis.
33
Act  (TSCA)); 40  C.F.R. § 156.10 (1998)  (detailing EPA regulations requiring warning  labels
on  pesticides  promulgated  under  the  Federal  Insecticide,  Fungicide  and  Rodenticide  Act
(FIFRA)).
29  See 21  U.S.C.  § 343(o)  (1994)  (requiring a warning on products  containing  saccharin
that the sweetener causes cancer in laboratory animals).
30  See Hazard  Communication,  29  C.F.R. § 1910.1200  (1998).  OSHA promulgated  a
standard requiring
all  chemical manufacturers  and importers to assess the hazards  of chemicals  which
they produce or import,  and all employers having workplaces  in  the manufacturing
division, ...  to provide information to their employees concerning hazardous chemi-
cals by  means of hazard  communication  programs including  labels, material  safety
data sheets, training, and access to written records.
Id.
31  See  52 Fed. Reg. 31,852  (1987)  (expanding the  scope of the HCS  to "cover  all em-
ployers with employees exposed to hazardous chemicals in their workplaces").
32 See  id.  ("Expansion of the scope of the HCS requires non-manufacturing  employers to
establish hazard communication programs to transmit information on the hazards of chemicals
to their employees by means of labels on containers,  material safety  data sheets, and training
programs.!).
33  See 58 Fed. Reg. 2,927  (1993).
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A great deal of recent attention has been given to informational  regula-
tion in the particular context of the communications  industry.  As an  alter-
native to direct regulation, which raises  especially severe First Amendment
problems,  the  government  might  attempt  to  increase  information  instead.
Thus, the mandatory  "V-chip"  is  intended to  permit parents  to block pro-
gramming that they want to exclude from their homes.34  The V-chip is sup-
posed to work hand-in-hand with a ratings system.35  Similarly, a provision
of the  1996 Telecommunications  Act (1) requires  television manufacturers
to include technology  capable of reading  a program rating mechanism;  (2)
requires the Federal Communications  Commission ("FCC") to create a rat-
ings  methodology  if the  industry  does  not produce  an acceptable  ratings
plan within a year; and (3) requires that broadcasters include a rating in their
signals if the relevant program  is rated.36  Spurred  by this statute, most of
the networks generated a system for television ratings that is now in place.37
A new set of proposals under current discussion would require broadcasters
to make public a set of reports about their public interest activities,  includ-
ing providing  free time  for political  candidates  and  educational  program-
ming. 38
As I have noted, some disclosure statutes are designed to trigger politi-
cal,  rather  than market,  mechanisms;  here  consumers  are  not  directly  in-
volved.  The  most famous  of these  statutes  is  NEPA.  Enacted  in  1972,
NEPA's principal  goal was to require  the government to compile  and dis-
close  environmentally  related  information  before  going  forward with  any
projects  having a major effect on  the environment. 39  NEPA does not re-
quire the government to give  environmental  effects  any particular weight,
nor is there judicial review of the substance of agency decisions.  The pur-
34 See JAMES  P.  HAMILTON,  CHANNELING  VIOLENCE:  THE  ECONOMIc  MARKET FOR
VIOLENT TELEVIsION  PROGRAMMING  289-92  (1998)  (discussing  the political call  for  a V-
chip .
See id. at 289 (noting that the V-chip can block programs which carry ratings).
36  1996 Telecommunications  Act,  58  U.S.C.  §§  151-611  (1998);  see also HAMILTON,
supra  note 34, at 302 (discussing ratings requirements).
37 See HAMILTON,  supra note 34, at 304-11  (detailing the development of the television
ratings system).
3 See  FINAL  REPORT  OF  THE  ADVISORY  COMMITTEE  ON  PUBLIC  INTEREST
OBLIGATIONS  OF  DIGITAL  TELEVISION  BROADCASTERS:  CHARTING  THE  DIGITAL
BROADCASTING  FUTURE  45-46  (1998)  [hereinafter  FINAL  REPORT]  (calling for  "enhanced
disclosures  of... public interest programming and  activities on a quarterly basis"  and other
recommendations);  Cass R. Sunstein, Private Broadcasters  and the Public Interest (1999)  (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author).
39 See  Calvert  Cliffs'  Coordinating  Comm.,  Inc.  v.  United  States  Atomic  Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971)  (noting NEPA's procedural goal).
40  See Strycker's  Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227  (1980)
(stating that "once  an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements,
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pose of disclosure is principally to trigger political safeguards  coming from
the government's  own judgments  or from  external  pressure.41  Hence,  any
governmental  indifference  to adverse  environmental effects  is perfectly  ac-
ceptable under NEPA.  The  idea behind  the statute  is that  if the public  is
concerned, then the government  will have to give some weight to environ-
mental effects.
In  1986,  Congress  enacted  an  ambitious statute, the Emergency  Plan-
ning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA"). 42  Under this statute,
firms and individuals must report to state and local governments the quanti-
ties of potentially  hazardous  chemicals  that have  been  stored  or released
into the environment.  Users of such chemicals must report to their local fire
departments  the location,  types,  and  quantities  of stored  chemicals.  They
must  also give  information about potential  adverse  health  effects.  On the
basis of the relevant results,  the EPA publishes  pollution data about the re-
lease of over 300 chemicals from over 20,000  facilities.43  This has been an
exceptional  success story, one that has well exceeded the expectations at the
time of the  statute's enactment.44  A  detailed  report  by the  General  Ac-
counting  Office suggests that EPCRA  has had important beneficial  effects,
spurring  innovative,  cost-effective  programs  from the EPA and from state
and local governments.45
Many  other statutes involving health,  safety,  and the environment fall
into  this general  category.  The Animal  Welfare  Act is designed  partly to
ensure  publicity  about the treatment  of animals; thus  covered  laboratories
are required  to file reports  with the government about their conduct,46 with
the apparent thought that the reports will deter noncompliance  and also al-
low  continual monitoring.  In  addition to  its various command-and-control
provisions,  the  Clean  Air  Act  requires  companies  to  create  and  disclose
"risk management  plans" involving accidental  releases of chemicals, which
the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered  the environmental  conse-
quences").
41  See id. (noting that NEPA is an "area of discretion of the executive  as to the choice  of
the action").
42  42 U.S.C.  §§  11,001-50 (1994); see also supra  note 5 and accompanying text.
43  See HAMILTON,  supra  note 34, at 302 (stating these figures for EPA pollution data).
44  See PERCIVAL ET AL.,  supra  note 24, at 624,  626 ("Congress anticipated that the avail-
ability of information ...  would enable the public to put substantial pressure on companies  to
reduce emissions.").
45  See  General  Accounting  Office,  Toxic  Chemicals,  Report  to  the  Congress  (1991)
[hereinafter GAO Report].
46  Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-59 (1994).
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must include  a worst  case scenario.
47  The  Safe  Drinking Water Act  was
amended in 1996 to require annual "consumer confidence reports" to be de-
veloped  and disseminated  by community  water  suppliers.48  Statutes  gov-
erning mortgages, crime, discrimination,  sexual violence,  and medical  care
also seem partly committed to the idea that "sunlight is... the best of disin-
fectants";49 thus, they  require  covered institutions to compile reports  about
their  conduct and compliance with  applicable  law.50  As noted, FECA  re-
quires  political  committees  to  disclose  a great  deal  of information  about
their  activities.  In  the  same  category  is  a  proposed  code for  television
broadcasters,  designed  partly  to  ensure publicity  about the  public  service
activities of various  stations.  Its goal is to ensure more in the way of such
activities  indirectly,  and simply  by virtue of the fact that  there  will  be a
public accounting.
5 1
For an overview, consider the following table:
47  42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (1994).
48  42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(4) (1994).
49  The phrase comes from Louis D. BRANDEIS,  OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE
BANKERS USE IT 62 (Torchbook ed. 1967).
50  See,  e.g.,  Home Mortgage  Disclosure Act of 1975  (HMDA),  12 U.S.C.  §§  2801-10
(1994)  (requiring banks to maintain records of where they make mortgage loans and to make
such  records  available  to  the public);  Community  Reinvestment  Act  of  1977  (CRA),  12
U.S.C. §§ 2901-07  (1994)  (subjecting banks to detailed reporting requirements  and rating the
banks based on the extent to which they serve their community);  Crime Awareness  and Cam-
pus Security Act of 1990  § 204(a), 20 U.S.C.  § 1092(0(1)-(6)  (1994) (requiring that colleges
develop policies to encourage  the prompt reporting of crimes to police and college officials);
Higher Education  Amendments  of 1992  § 486(c)(1)-(2),  20  U.S.C.  § 1092(f)(1)(F),  (t)(7)
(1994)  (requiring that colleges  compile and report statistics on  listed crimes including  sexual
assault,  and requiring that  colleges  promulgate and enforce  policies  against  sexual  assault);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§  1319,  1342,  1369 (1994)  (requiring permit
holders  to  sample  their  discharges  and  then  submit  the results  in  the  form  of discharge-
monitoring reports  ("DMRs") to the proper  authority; these DMRs are made  available to the
public).
51  See FINAL REPORT, supra  note 38, at 45-46 (discussing proposed disclosures of public
interest activities).
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Table 1. Examples of Informational Regulation
[Vol.  147:  613
Trigger Market  Trigger Political
Reactions  Reactions
Tobacco warnings  EPCRA (annual
legislation  reports)
Nutrition regulation  Proposed broadcasters
Duties  Warnings for television  code
Imposed on  programming  Animal Welfare Act
P  Hazardous materials  Clean Air Act's "risk warning regulation  management plans"
Telecommunications  Age Discrimination Act
Act of 1996 (ratings
system)
Warnings about the use  EPCRA (Toxic Release
of drugs  Inventory) Duties  NP •NEPA
Imposed on  Safe Drinking Water
Government  Act
_  FECA
B.  Rationale
Why has information disclosure become such a central regulatory tool?
There are several answers.  For various  reasons, a market failure  may come
in the form of an inadequate  supply of information.52  Because information
is generally a public good53 -something  that if provided  to one is also pro-
vided to all or many-workers and consumers may attempt to free ride on
the efforts of others, resulting in too little information being provided.  For
this reason, compulsory  disclosure  of information  can provide the simplest
response to the relevant market failure.
52  See OGUS, supra  note 4, at 121-23  (1994)  (discussing information deficits).
53  Of course, it is possible  to give information  more  "private good"  characteristics,  and
innovative  approaches  can  be expected  in the  next decade.  Consider, for example,  fees  for
access to information on the Internet or the subscription-based  Consumer  Reports. Neither of
these approaches converts information into a private good, but both reduce the range of people
who may, without high cost, have access to it.  Thus, it is possible to imagine  a range of ap-
proaches that  would diminish  the  cost  of access  for some or many, while  increasing  it, or
holding it constant, for others.INFORMATIONAL STANDING
It is  increasingly recognized that information is often  a far less  expen-
sive and more efficient strategy than command-and-control,  which consists
of rigid mandates about regulatory  ends (a certain  percentage  reduction in
sulfur dioxide, for example), regulatory means (a technological mandate for
cars, for example), or both. 4  A chief advantage of informational regulation
is its comparative flexibility.  If consumers  are informed of the salt or sugar
content of foods, they can proceed as they wish, trading off various product
characteristics  however they see fit.  If workers are given information about
the risks posed by their workplace, then they can trade safety against other
possible  variables  (such as  salary,  investments  for  children  or retirement,
and leisure).55  From the standpoint of efficiency,  information remedies  can
be  better than  either  command-and-control  regulation  or reliance  on un-
regulated markets alone.
From the  democratic  point of view, informational  regulation  also  has
substantial  advantages.  A well-functioning  system of deliberative  democ-
racy requires a certain degree of information,  so that citizens can engage in
their  monitoring  and deliberative  tasks.  Subject  as  they  are  to  parochial
pressures,  segments  of the government may have insufficient incentives  to
disclose information on their own; consider FOIA or FECA, where the self-
interest of the government  or private  groups may press  in the  direction of
too little disclosure.  A good way to enable citizens to oversee  government
action and also to assess the need for less, more, or different regulation, is to
inform them of both private and public activity.  The very fact that the pub-
lic will be in a position to engage  in general monitoring may well spur de-
sirable outcomes.
EPCRA  is the most obvious  example here.  Sharp,  cost-effective,  and
largely  unanticipated reductions  in toxic releases have  come about without
anything  in the  way of direct  regulation.56  This  approach  appears  to  be
emerging  as the wave of the future.57  In the area of broadcasting,  it is pos-
sible to hope that disclosure  of public  interest programming,  and the mere
need to  compile  the  information  each year, will  increase  educational  and
public affairs programming without involving government mandates at all.5
54  See BREYER, supra  note 4, at 161-64 (analyzing disclosure as an alternative regulatory
regime);  OGUS,  supra  note 4, at 121-49  (explaining the  less interventionist strategy of infor-
mation regulation).
55  See  CASS R.  SUNSTEiN,  FREE  MARKETS  AND  SOCIAL  JUSTICE  327-28  (1997)  (dis-
cussing efficiency and information).
56  See  PERCIVAL ET  AL.,  supra note  24, at 612-16  (discussing  the efficacy  of informa-
tional approaches to toxic substance regulation).
57 See supra text accompanying notes 4-10.
58  See HAMILTON,  supra note 34, at 302 (discussing  informal governmental  attempts to
increase educational programming).
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A primary virtue of informational  regulation is that it triggers political safe-
guards  and allows  citizens  a continuing  oversight role-one that is, in the
best cases, largely self-enforcing.
C. Policies  and  Prospects
None of this is to say that informational regulation is  always desirable.
Under imaginable  assumptions such regulation will be inferior to command-
and-control regulation and to reliance on markets  unaccompanied by disclo-
sure requirements.  There  are  two problems with informational  strategies.
First, providing  information  may  be  expensive,  sometimes  costing  more
than  it is worth.  Second, the provision  of information  is  sometimes  inef-
fectual, or even counterproductive.
Consider, for example, the fact that the government estimated the cost
of the  FDA disclosure  rules  as  "$1.7  billion  over twenty  years. 59  The
president of the National Food Processors Association claimed that the first-
year costs alone would exceed $2  billion.6 0  In  either case, the cost is sig-
nificant,  and an important  question is  what improvements-in terms of re-
duced  mortality  or  morbidity-are  produced  in  return.  OSHA's  hazard
communication policy is estimated to save 200 lives per year-a large num-
ber-but at an annual cost of $360 million.61  The expenditure per life saved
is therefore  $1.8  million.  This is far better than a large number of regula-
tions, and is probably  an  amount well worth spending;  but it is more than
many agencies spend for life-saving regulations.62  The OSHA rule does not
stand out as a means of saving lives especially cheaply.63  (Of course there
59 Nancy Ryan & Linda M.  Harrington, FDA Offers New Rules on Food Labels, Claims,
CHI. TRiB., Nov. 7,  1991, at 2.
60  See id.
61  These figures come from John F. Morrall III, A  Review  of  the Record,  10 REGULATION
25,  30  (Nov./Dec.  1986),  which  was  criticized  in  Lisa  Heinzerling,  Regulatory Costs of
Mythic Proportions,  107 YALE L.J.  1981,  1999-2000 (1998).
62  See  W. Kip VISCuSI,  FATAL  TRADEOFFS:  PUBLIC AND  PRIVATE  REsPONsIBILIEs
FOR RISK 264 (1992).
63  When  informational  strategies  are  costly,  there are  two possible responses  from  the
government.  The first is to do nothing.  If the savings-in terms of health, life, and informed
choice-are relatively low, then  costly strategies, even informational  ones, make  little sense.
There will, therefore,  be circumstances  in which a government remedy  for an absence of in-
formation is unwarranted.
The second possibility is to impose a regulatory  strategy rather than to require disclosure.
By a regulatory  strategy I mean a mandatory outcome, such  as a flat ban on the materials in
question, or governmental  specification of a particular outcome,  as in a mandated maximum
level of carcinogens  in the workplace.  Sometimes the regulatory  strategy will be cheaper be-
cause the price of disclosing information-changing  packaging and so forth-is so high.  This
is likely to be the right response when most or all people would respond  to the information in
the same way.  In that case, it is unnecessary  to provide information, and better simply to dic-
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are likely to be large  morbidity and other gains that are not captured  in the
"lives saved" number.)
Even  when  informational  strategies  are  not  prohibitively  expensive,
they  may  be  ineffectual  and  thus  have  low  benefits;  they  may  even  be
counterproductive.  This is  so  for various  reasons,  and  here  a great deal
more work remains to be done.  People have a limited ability to process in-
formation.6  They  have a  notoriously  difficult  time thinking  about  low-
probability events.  Sometimes people discount such  events to zero; some-
times  they treat them  as much more dangerous  than they  actually  are.  If
people  are told,  for example,  that a certain  substance  causes  cancer, then
they may think that it is  far more dangerous than it is  in fact.65  But some
carcinogenic substances  pose little risk of cancer.  There  is also a pervasive
risk of "alarmist bias,"  as frightening information is more salient and potent
than comforting information, regardless of what is true.
66
For example,  California's Proposition 65, an initiative designed  to pro-
mote citizen awareness of risk levels, requires warnings for exposure to car-
cinogens.67  At first glance, the requirement seems entirely unexceptionable,
indeed an important advance.  But it has in some ways been counterproduc-
tive.  Consumers appear to think that twelve of every 100 users of a product
with the required warning will die from cancer, an estimate that exceeds re-
ality by  a factor of 1000 or more.
68  With respect to information,  less  may
be more.  If information is not provided  in a clear and usable form, it may
actually  make people less knowledgeable than they were before, producing
overreactions,  or underreactions,  based on an ability to understand what the
information  actually means.  People also face a pervasive risk of "informa-
tion overload,"  causing consumers to treat a large amount of information  as
tate an outcome that, by hypothesis,  is generally or almost universally preferred.  For an espe-
cially  dangerous substance,  one that reasonable people  would choose not to encounter, a flat
ban is appropriate.
64 See JUDGMENT  UNDER  UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS  AND  BIASES  (Daniel Kahneman
et al.  eds.,  1982);  Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral  Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN.  L. REV.  1471,  1533-37  (1998)  (discussing how simply  providing information  "is  not
enough").
See W.  KIP Viscusi, PRODUCT-RISK  LABELING:  A FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY  11-16
(1993)  (analyzing  the results of California's  Proposition  65); W.  Kip ViSCUsI,  RATIONAL
RISK POLICY 5 (1998)  (suggesting that "[i]ndividual  risk perceptions are often in error").
66  See W.  Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions  with Divergent Risk Information, 107 ECON. J.
1657,  1666-67  (1997)  ("m[The  fear of the worst  case scenario  receives  greater weight than
does the low risk assessment.").
67  See PERCIVAL ET  AL.,  supra  note 24,  at 616-21  (describing  California's  approach to
the information problem).
68  See W.  Kip Viscusi, Predicting  the Effects of  Food Cancer  Risk Warnings on Consum-
ers, 43  FOOD DRUG  COSM.  L.J.  283, 288  (1988)  (finding that "individuals  have a difficult
time in processing refined distinctions between very miniscule probabilities").
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equivalent to no information at all.69  Certainly this is true when disclosure
campaigns are filled with details that cannot be processed easily.
With respect to industry  responses, companies  may respond to  certain
disclosure  requirements by refusing to provide information at all (if this is
an available option).  The result will be the removal from the market of in-
formation that is  useful  overall.  If industry  responds to  a requirement  of
evidentiary support for scientific claims with mere "puffing,"  then consum-
ers may have less  information than they  did to begin  with.  If advertisers
must conduct extensive tests before they are permitted to make claims, then
they will be given a strong incentive to avoid making claims at all.
70
There  is  a further  problem:  optimistic  bias.7I  People  often  believe
themselves  to be immune from risks that they acknowledge  are significant
and real with respect to others.  About 90%  of people believe that they are
above-average  drivers, less likely than others to be involved  in automobile
accidents.72  In one study, 97% of those surveyed ranked themselves  as av-
erage  or  above  average  in their  ability  to  avoid  both  bicycle  and power
mower accidents. 73  If most people think that the information does not apply
to them, disclosure requirements may have little effect.
Disclosure  strategies may  also  have  disproportionately  little  effect  on
people  who are undereducated,  elderly, or poor.  If this is so, the disadvan-
taged may continue to face the risks that informational  disclosure strategies
are  aimed  to  counteract  (at  least  if market  forces  fail  to  induce  general
changes from producers).74  And when risks are placed on outsiders who are
69  See Jacob Jacoby et al., Corrective  Advertising and  Affirmative Disclosure  Statements:
Their  Potential  for Confusing and  Misleading  the Consumer, 46 J. MARKETING  61, 70 (1982)
(describing how the language used in remedial statements designed to correct misleading ad-
vertising messages  may be more confusing  to the  consumer than the advertising message  it-
self).0
70 See Richard  Craswell, Interpreting  Deceptive Advertising, 65  B.U. L. REV.  658,  719-
25 (1985)  (noting the various incentives that sellers have to not disclose useful information).
71  See Christine Jolls  et al., A  Behavioral  Approach to Law and  Economics, 50 STAN.  L.
REV.  1471,  1524-27  (1998)  (describing optimistic bias as "[a]  common feature of human be-
havior" where "[p]eople  tend to think that bad events are far less likely to happen to them than
to others").
72  See SHELLEY E. TAYLOR,  POSITIVE ILLUSIONS:  CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND THE
HEALTHY MIND  10-11 (1993).
73  See id. at 116.
74  See George W. Schucker et al.,  The Impact of the Saccharin Warning  Label on Sales of
Diet Soft Drinks in Supermarkets,  2 J. PUB.  POL'Y & MARKETING 46, 54-56 (1983)  (finding
no change in diet soft drink sales  in poor, undereducated  areas after the FDA added warning
labels).
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not in a contractual  relationship with the wrongdoer,5  information may  do
little good, because  the outsiders  are  not in a position to  extract  a higher
price in return for the relevant risk, and may in fact be unable to do anything
about it.
76
These  points  should be taken  as  cautionary notes,  and not as sugges-
tions that  informational  regulation  is  ill  advised.  Whether  informational
regulation is preferable  to complete reliance on markets,  or instead to regu-
lation through  command-and-control  or through  economic  incentives,  de-
pends on the details.  Certainly there is reason, in both theory and practice,
to  think that  informational  regulation  is  the  best approach  in  many  con-
texts.77  The most promising  setting involves  a market failure  in the provi-
sion of information  and reason to believe that information  can be provided
in such a way as to be understandable to the people who receive it.
D.  Why Suits?  Why Citizen Suits?
As we will  see, Congress sometimes  explicitly  authorizes  citizen suits
to ensure disclosure of information.  Where Congress  is not explicit, infer-
ences must be drawn about legislative  instructions; the Administrative  Pro-
cedure Act ("APA") or some other source of law may or may not be read to
allow apparent outsiders to bring suit to require disclosure.  This possibility
leaves an obvious question.  Why does Congress give standing to citizens or
others to allow them to use courts to require  government, or regulated par-
ties, to disclose information? 7 8
The simplest answer is connected to the reason for statutes requiring in-
formation disclosure in the first instance.  Both agencies and private compa-
nies often have powerful  incentives to withhold information,  and suits can
serve both as an ex ante deterrent and as an ex post corrective to an unlaw-
ful failure to disclose.  In the face of disclosure requirements,  government
failure may mimic  market  failure,  and a right to bring  suit might  provide
75  The notions of "outsiders"  and "wrongdoers"  are of course pre-Coasian.  See RONALD
H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95-156 (1988)  (discussing the reciprocal
and interactive nature of harms).  I use the terms to build on common understandings.
76  See  BREYER,  supra note 4,  at  23  (discussing  how  information  is an  inadequate  re-
sponse to externalities);  OGUS, supra  note 4, at 310 (same).
77  See the suggestive discussion  in JAMES T. HAMILTON,  CHANNELING VIOLENCE:  THE
ECONOMIC MARKET FOR VIOLENT TELEVISION PROGRAMMING  310 (1998),  finding that "in-
formation provision offers a way to reduce exposure of children to violent programming while
allowing adult views to consume what they wish,"  and MAGAT & VIsCUsI, supra  note 4, at 4-
9, discussing  the  advantages  of informational  regulation  in the  hazard  warning  context,  in
which the government seeks to reduce accident and health risks.
78  As noted, there is a separate  question  about the  actual origins of the relevant  law; the
answer to that question likely will depend on the constellation of  relevant interest groups.
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some help.  The incentive not to disclose takes multiple forms.  People may
not want to  disclose because  of the sheer economic burden  of doing so in
the first instance.  It can be quite costly to compile and disseminate the rele-
vant reports.  Consider the large expense involved in producing an EIS,79 as
well  as  other  paperwork  requirements  that  may  impose  substantial  bur-
dens.
80
In addition, both private and public agencies may have an incentive  not
to  disclose  because  of the  qualitatively  diverse problems,  and  costs,  that
may  follow  disclosure.  The  market  may  well  punish  bad  news  via  de-
creased  sales or (perhaps in consequence)  decreased  stock prices;  the pun-
ishment  may be mild,  optimal,  or excessive  and  alarmist,81 and  it can  be
hard to predict in advance.  A cereal company that discloses the nutritional
content of its foods may find itself with much fewer purchasers;  a company
that discloses workplace risks may have to increase wages or cut back pro-
duction.  An agency and affected  developers  may resist  compiling an EIS
because once the statement is made public, the project itself will be in jeop-
ardy.  The perception of  jeopardy may impose costly delays  and eventually
development  may be blocked  entirely-a far from uncommon result of the
EIS  process.82  So  too,  a political organization  that discloses  its  financial
backers may find itself far less influential.
These incentives not to disclose may be especially hard to counteract in
83 light of the fact that information is often a public good.  As noted above,
the benefits of disclosure  are often  obtained by many people,  whereas the
costs of ensuring disclosure are borne (at least in the short run) by one or a
few.  In  these  circumstances,  it  is  possible  that with  market  ordering,  or
even  a  law  on  the books,  few or  none will  bother  to take  the necessary
steps--economic, political,  or otherwise-to  counteract the unlawful with-
holding of information.  Thus, the economic and political markets  may un-
derproduce disclosure, even in the face of a law that mandates it.
79  Millions  of dollars  are  appropriated  each  year  for  federal  oversight  alone.  See
WILLIAM RODGERS,  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW 806 (1994).
80  Hard data are difficult to find, but the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§
3501-20 (1994 & Supp. 111996), was a clear response to perceived expenses.
&I  There  is  a real  possibility  of an alarmist  reaction,  producing  excessive  punishment;
alarmist information  is  especially  salient and hence memorable,  and people might read non-
alarmist information  in an alarming way.  See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51  STAN.  L. REV.  (forthcoming  Apr.  1999); Viscusi,  supra
note 66,  at 1668 (concluding  that people overvalue risk, overreact to highly publicized  risks,
and "place considerable weight on the risk information provided to them").
8? See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 24,  at  1060-65 (discussing the  adequacy  of the EIS
approach).
83  See BREYER,  supra note  4, at 26  (discussing the public good aspects of information);
OGUS, supra  note 4, at 121-26 (same).
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Congress may offer a broad grant of standing-perhaps even to citizens
generally-so  as  to  counteract  the  relevant  incentives.  The  hope  is  that
some plaintiff, whether altruistic or self-interested,  will take steps to ensure
the availability  of information.  FOIA  is  the most obvious example.  The
grant of the power to  obtain information,  and to  litigate, to "any person"84
operates to  inform  agencies that there will be ready judicial  review of any
denial of a FOIA request, a factor that should make agencies  less  likely to
engage in unlawful denials.  In any case, such denials can and often will be
corrected if they are unlawful.  Or Congress may decide that citizens gener-
ally can bring suit against the FEC to ensure  compliance with federal cam-
paign  laws,  believing  that  this  mechanism  will  deter violations  of a law
central to the electoral  process.  A general  grant of standing  may  help to
remedy the problems created by the relevant incentives and the public-good
character of information, for there may be someone, out of a large group of
potential beneficiaries,  who is willing to bear the costs of a lawsuit.  As we
shall see, Akins itself is a prime example.
8 5
None of this  is to say that  a grant of informational  standing  is a good
idea.  Lawsuits  can be expensive;  they  also can  be diversionary  and even
frivolous.  With respect  to  information,  a grant of standing  to all  citizens
may divert an agency from its preferred course of action and can make  sen-
sible priority-setting  extremely difficult.  It even may involve a kind of pri-
vate  conscription  of public  resources86 in  a  way that  undermines  a fully
democratic  effort, by the agency  involved, to allocate  its  limited resources
to the most serious problems.  If all citizens can bring suit against the FEC
to require it to regulate all groups that any citizen would like to see treated
as  "political  committees,"  then the FEC may have to  spend all of its  time
defending  itself in court.  If any agency  definition of "animals"  can prompt
a federal action by some citizen asking the government to expand its defini-
87 tion,  the  government  may  have  fewer  resources  to  enforce  the  Animal
Welfare  Act.  Alternatively,  the mere  risk of a citizen suit  may  lead the
agency to an outcome that it believes is undesirable,  and that perhaps is, in
84 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
85  See infra  Part II (discussing the Court's holding and analysis in Akins).
86  See  Michael  S.  Greve,  Private Enforcement, Private Rewards:  How Environmental
Citizen Suits  Became an Entitlement Program, in  ENvIRONMENTAL  POLITICS:  PUBLIC
COSTS,  PRIVATE REWARDs  105,  108-10 (Michael  S.  Greve & Fred  L. Smith, Jr. eds.,  1992)
(discussing the  increase in private enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act as a result
of  the ease in bringing such actions,  the  EPA's desire to settle the suits, and the subsequent
transfer of settlement payments from the agency to private environmental  groups).
87  See  Animal  Legal  Defense  Fund, Inc.  v. Espy,  23  F.3d  496, 496  (D.C.  Cir.  1994)
("Animal welfare groups and two individuals brought suit challenging  [a] regulation promul-
gated by  [the]  Department of Agriculture that failed  to include birds, rats  and mice  as 'ani-
mals' within the meaning of [the] Federal Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (FLAWA).").
1999]632  UNIVERSITY OF  PENNSYLVANIA  LAWREVIEW
fact,  undesirable.  From  the  agency's  point  of view,  if the  suit  can  be
avoided by choosing a certain route, why not choose that route, even if the
suit might be unsuccessful  and even if the problem at hand does not deserve
agency attention?
These points are sufficient to show that it cannot be decided,  in the ab-
stract, whether a grant of informational standing is or is not desirable.  The
answer  depends  on  a range  of empirical  issues-the  likely  performance,
without lawsuits,  of the agency and the private sector; the cost of any law-
suits;  the effects of lawsuits on  the agency's  capacity  for  priority-setting;
and the effects of lawsuits on the agency's substantive regulation.  It would
be highly desirable to obtain a great deal more information on these points.
E. Standing  Puzzles and  Problems
Before Akins, the law governing standing to obtain information was in
considerable  disarray,  probably  in  even  more  disarray  than  the  law  of
standing generally.  The most serious question was how the "injury in fact"
requirement8  should operate  in cases  involving  a deprivation  of access to
information.  The Supreme  Court has held that a public interest group, con-
sisting of citizens, suffered  an injury in fact when the group was deprived of
information that  was required  to  be disclosed under the  statute governing
federal  advisory committees.89  The Court has also held that deprivation  of
information concerning available housing constituted a sufficiently "specific
injury" to establish injury in fact.90  Lower courts have uniformly upheld the
general grant of standing under FOIA, but without providing a clear ration-
ale for doing so.
91
Outside of the FOIA context, the leading  case is Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,92 which invalidated  a congressional  grant of citizen  standing  and
suggested that  citizens  could  not bring  suit unless  a "concrete"  and "par-
88  See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders  of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561  (1992)  (establishing that
the "irreducible  constitutional  minimum of standing  contains three elements,"  one of which is
that the "plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury  in fact').
89  See Public Citizen  v. Department of Justice,  491 U.S.  440, 449 (1989)  (rejecting the
department's  argument that the plaintiff did not allege sufficient injury so as to confer stand-
ing).0
See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982).
91  See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the  Press v. Sampson, 591 F.2d 944,  945 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (granting standing  to plaintiffs seeking access to Richard Nixon's presidential ma-
terials  through FOIA);  Skolnick v. Parsons,  397  F.2d 523,  524-25  (7th  Cir.  1968)  (holding
that the  plaintiff had standing  to bring an  action to  compel  the  President's  Commission  on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice to release a specific report).
92  504 U.S. at 571-72 (1992)  (holding that the  respondents lacked standing  to seek judi-
cial review of Section 7(a)(2) of  the Endangered  Species Act of 1973).
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ticularized" interest was at stake.  93  This idea seemed to suggest that a widely  generalized injury,  of  the sort often invoked  by  information-seeking
plaintiffs, would  not be a  sufficient basis for standing. Thus,  the injury in
fact requirement,  after Lujan, appeared to  merge with the ban  on standing
for those invoking generalized grievances,  and to have created serious ad-
verse consequences for those seeking informational standing.94  At the same
time, lower courts generally agreed that withholding information to which a
plaintiff had a legal right was sufficient to create a legal injury for purposes of Article  111. 95  But  a complex set of rulings  from the D.C.  Circuit sug-
gested  that a  plaintiff  whose  injury was  widely shared  would  be  held  to not
have  standing under the "zone of  interests" test. 
96
It  seemed  clear  that the  Court's recent  standing  cases were  on a  kind of
collision course with a  number of statutes, including FOIA and FECA,
which  gave standing to citizens generally. It  was against this background
that the Court decided Akins.
II.  WHAT THE COURT SAID
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee ("AIPAC") may or may
not be a "political committee"  within the meaning of FECA.  If AIPAC is a political  committee,  then it  is  subect to a  range of legal restrictions, in-
volving, for example, statutory limits on the amount that it can contribute to
a candidate for political  office.
97  More  importantly  for the particular pur-
poses of informational standing, FECA imposes a number of record-keeping and disclosure  requirements  on  all  political  committees. 98  These require-
ments are designed  to expose a  range of  political  activities to public view.
As a  result,  such committees must  register with the FEC keep names and
addresses of  contributors; record  the purpose and amount  of  disbursements;
and  file annual reports to the  FEC  which  include  lists of donors  giving more
than $200 per year, contributions,  expenditures,  and disbursements.g  A  se-
ries  of complex  provisions  define "political  committee."  The  statute  also
93  Id.  at 560.
94 See Federal  Election Comm'n v. Akins,  118 S.  Ct. 1777,  1791  (1998)  (Scalia, J.,  dis-
senting) (questioning the majority's suggestion that abstract interests "go hand in hand" with
those which are unduly shared).
95 See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for a legal
injury).
96  See infra notes 212-13,  218-19, 225-27 and accompanying text (discussing the zone of
interests test).
97 See 2 U.S.C.  §§ 432-34 (1992).
98  See id. (codifying registration requirements for political committees).
99 See id.
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provides  that "any  person who believes  a violation  of this Act ...  has  oc-
curred,  may  file a complaint with the Commission."'00  It adds that "[a]ny
party aggrieved by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint filed
by such party ...  may file  a petition"'1 1 to seek  review of the dismissal  of
the complaint.
In  1997,  a  number  of voters  attempted  to  persuade  the  FEC to  treat
AIPAC  as a political committee.102  Their evident motivation  was political
disagreement with AIPAC.  They also believed that AIPAC was involved in
campaign activities  and that the FEC had behaved unlawfully  in failing to
engage  in regulation  and  in failing to require  disclosure  of AIPAC's  rele-
vant activities.103  After extended deliberation, the FEC concluded that it did
not consider AIPAC to be such a committee, because  "the Act's definition
of 'political  committee'  includes  only  those  organizations  that  have  as  a
'major  purpose'  the nomination or election of candidates.' 0 4  AIPAC was
an "issue-oriented  lobbying organization, not a campaign-related  organiza-
tion." 1 05  Disagreeing  with  the  FEC's judgment,  the voter-plaintiffs  then
filed  suit  to  seek review  of the  complaint,  claiming  that they  were  "ag-
grieved"  and therefore  statutorily  authorized  to  bring  suit.  The  FEC  re-
sponded by asserting, among other things, that the voters lacked standing in
their capacity as citizens and that the suit should therefore be dismissed.
In Akins, the Supreme  Court held that the voters had standing because
of their interest in obtaining the relevant information about AIPAC.1 6  The
analysis came in four parts.  First, the Court said that there was no problem
with  "prudential  standing." °7   Congress  itself  had  granted  standing  to
"[a]ny  party aggrieved,"'08 and any prudential limits had been overcome  by
statute and were therefore inapplicable.
0 9
100  Id. §  437g(a)(1).
11  Id. § 437g(a)(8)(A).
102  See Federal  Election  Comm'n v. Akins,  118  S.  Ct. 1777,  1781-82 (1998)  (discussing
the efforts of a group of voters from which this case arose).
103  See id. (noting that voters had "views often opposed to those of AIPAC").
104 Id. at 1782-83.
105  Id.
106  See id. at 1784 (holding that plaintiffs suffered  a "genuine  'injury in fact'  since they
could not obtain information  concerning AIPAC donors and contributions).
107  Id. at 1783.
108  Id.
109  In his dissent, Justice  Scalia disagreed on  this point, suggesting  that there  was a dif-
ference between a "party"  who could  file a complaint with the FEC and a "party aggrieved"
who could bring suit.  See id. at  1789-90 (Scalia, J.,  dissenting) (calling the majority's  inter-
pretation of an aggrieved party "too much of a stretch").
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Second, the  plaintiffs  suffered  injury  in fact,  and  hence  the statutory
grant of standing to citizens  was constitutional. 1 10  The  injury "consists  of
their inability  to  obtain information-lists  of AIPAC  donors ...  and cam-
paign-related contributions  and expenditures-that, on respondents'  view of
the law, the statute requires that AIPAC make public."''  The Court added
that there was  "no  reason to doubt their claim that the  information would
help them ...  to evaluate candidates for public office, especially  candidates
who received assistance from AIPAC, and to evaluate the role that AIPAC's
financial  assistance  might play  in a specific  election." 11 2  This injury was
sufficiently "concrete  and particular" for purposes of Article III.
The Court faced a possible obstacle to this conclusion in  United States
v. Richardson. 13  There, a plaintiff bringing  suit principally as a taxpayer
sought information  involving  the  expenditures  of the Central  Intelligence
Agency ("CIA"), which, in his view, had to be made public under the Ac-
counts Clause  of the Constitution.  The  Court denied  standing.114  As the
Akins Court explained,  this was because  there was no  "logical  nexus" be-
tween the plaintiffs taxpayer status and the claimed failure  of Congress to
require a more detailed report of CIA expenditures. 115  In Akins, by contrast,
"there is a statute which, as we have previously pointed out[,]  ...  does seek
to  protect  individuals ...  from the  kind  of harm  they  say  they  have  suf-
fered."" 6  Under FECA,  the  'logical  nexus'  inquiry"  in Richardson was
thus entirely  irrelevant.117  In a crucial passage, the Court added that Akins
was  a  case  involving  not  taxpayer  standing,  but  voter  standing.  If
Richardson had  involved  voter standing,  the  question  would  have  arisen
whether  the  Constitution's  "general  directives"  allowed  for  enforcement
through lawsuits brought by private  persons.  The answer  to that question
"(like  the  answer  to  whether there  was taxpayer  standing  in Richardson)
would have rested in significant part upon the Court's view of the Accounts
Clause."118
At this point, the Court turned to the third standing question:  whether
standing  was  lacking  because  the  injury  was  a "generalized  grievance,"
110  See id. at 1784 (stating that a plaintiff suffers an injury in fact when the plaintiff "fails
to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute").
II Id.
112 Id.
113  418 U.S.  166, 179-80  (1974) (holding that respondents  lacked standing because they
had nothing more than "generalized grievances"  and had not suffered an actual injury).
114  See id. at 171.
115  Akins, 118 S.  Ct. at 1784; see also Richardson,  418 U.S. at 175.
116  Akins, 118  S. Ct. at 1785.
117  Id.
18 Id.
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shared by all or most citizens.  The Court acknowledged that previous deci-
sions  suggested  "that where  large  numbers of Americans  suffer  alike,  the
political process,  rather than the judicial process, may provide the more ap-
propriate remedy for a widely shared grievance."' 19  Indeed,  in some cases,
including Richardson itself, the Court suggested that Article III might be an
obstacle to a suit by plaintiffs whose injuries were widely shared.120  But the
Court concluded  that with  an express  congressional  grant of standing, the
generalized  character  of the grievance  here was  no  obstacle,  because  the
limitation  was  prudential  in  character.  In  its key  step,  the  Court distin-
guished  between  injuries that are  widely  shared  and injuries that  are  "ab-
stract and indefinite."  An abstract injury-such as an injury "to the interest
in seeing  that the  law is  obeyed"121 -would  not allow  for  standing.  By
contrast, a concrete  but widely  shared injury would suffice for purposes of
Article  III.  "Thus the fact that a political forum may be more readily avail-
able where an injury  is widely  shared (while counseling against, say, inter-
preting  a statute as  conferring  standing)  does not, by  itself, automatically
disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. ' 122  This point seemed to the
Court "obvious"  for cases  involving the same common law injury, as  in a
mass  tort  or  an  "interference  with  voting  rights.' '123  "We  conclude  that
similarly,  the informational  injury  at issue here,  directly  related  to voting,
the most basic of political rights,  is sufficiently  concrete  and specific such
that the fact that it is widely  shared does not deprive Congress of constitu-
tional power to authorize its vindication in federal courts. 124
The fourth and final standing  issue involved redressability.  Would the
plaintiffs'  injury be remedied  by a decree in their favor?  The FEC  urged
that even if it agreed with the plaintiffs on the law, it may have exercised its
statutory  discretion so as not to require AIPAC to produce the information.
Thus the plaintiffs'  injury might not be redressed by a decree in their favor.
The  Court  answered  with  an  analogy:  "Agencies  often  have  discretion
about  whether  or not to take  a particular  action.  Yet those  adversely  af-
fected  by a  discretionary  agency decision  generally  have standing to  com-
plain that the agency based its  decision upon an improper legal  ground."'25
The Court explained that it is typical to remand a case after a judicial judg-
119 Id.
120  See, e.g.,  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,  504 U.S.  555, 576-78  (1992)  (suggesting
that Article III may prevent a citizen with only generalized  grievances from bringing suit).
121  Akins,  118 S. Ct. at 1786.
122  Id.
123  Id.
124  Id.
125  Id. (citing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,  140 (1967)).
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ment, even though the  agency may  end up doing the same thing  after the
remand.  This familiar practice was sufficient to justify a conclusion that the
plaintiffs had met the redressability requirements.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion was rooted in a concern that the legal
provision in FECA "is  an extraordinary one,  conferring upon a private per-
son the ability  to  bring an Executive  agency  into  court  to  compel  its en-
forcement  of the law against a third party." 126  His principal argument  in-
voked Richardson,  which, in Justice Scalia's view, held that in order to have
standing, each plaintiff's harm must be "particularized,"  in the sense that it
affects him "in a personal and individual way."127  In a mass tort, each per-
son suffers "a particularized and differentiated harm"; but in this case, as in
Richardson,  the harm  caused to the plaintiff is "precisely  the same  as the
harm caused to everyone else.'' 28  The requirement of a particularized harm
is also based on a sound understanding of Article II, which gives the Execu-
tive, not the courts, the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed.' 29
Justice Scalia complained that the logic of the Court's opinion is that "it
is within  the power of Congress to authorize  any interested person to man-
age  (through  the courts)  the  Executive's  enforcement  of any  law that  in-
cludes  a requirement for the filing and public availability of a piece of pa-
per."130  The result of allowing suits in cases like these is to produce "a shift
of political responsibility to a branch  designed  not to protect the public at
large but to protect individual rights.' ' 131  This result would violate both Ar-
ticle III and Article  11.132
III.  EVALUATINGAKiNS:  INFORMATIONAL  STANDING AS A QUESTION OF
STATUTORY LAW
I now turn to an evaluation of the  Court's principal conclusions.  The
unifying theme is that with respect to information, and perhaps more gener-
ally, the  Court  has rooted the  standing  question  firmly  in Congress's  in-
structions.  Whether  a plaintiff has standing depends  on what the relevant
126 Id. at 1788 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 1791  (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128  Id.
129  U.S.  CONST. art. II, § 3.
130  Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1792 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131  Id. This point amounts to a one-sentence summary  of Justice  Scalia's influential  es-
say on standing.  See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of  Standing  as an Essential  Element of  the
Separation  of  Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
132  See Akins, 118 S. Ct  at  1791-92  (Scalia, J.,  dissenting) (arguing  that the statute un-
constitutionally transfers executive power under Article II to Article III courts).
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statute  says.  For both the "injury  in fact" and generalized grievance issues,
the foundation for the Court's conclusion is that Congress created  a legally
cognizable injury and gave citizens the right to redress that injury in court.
The Court was correct to stress this point, and as we  shall see, the em-
phasis on  congressional  instructions  carries  with it  a number of important
implications.  Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion  is also correct insofar as it
contends that the Court suggests that Congress may create an interest in in-
formation and allow people to vindicate that interest  in court.  But Justice
Scalia is wrong to suggest that this outcome would violate the Constitution.
A.  Injuries,  in Fact  and in Law
Begin with  the idea of "injury  in fact."  The Court held that there was
such  an  injury  in Akins because the  plaintiffs  were  denied  information  to
which they had a legal right.
133  Because the statute created a right to infor-
mation of which they  were  deprived, the plaintiffs  suffered  an injury that
was sufficient for Article III  purposes.  Was the Court correct  in reaching
this conclusion?
1. Preliminaries:  Of Fact and Law
To answer this question, it is  necessary to  step back a bit.  There now
appears to be a consensus that the "injury in fact" idea has extremely serious
problems.134  The first problem  is that the idea is not a product of the text or
history of the Constitution;  it  is a recent  innovation  by the Court itself.135
To be  sure,  the text  of the  Constitution does  require  a "case"  or "contro-
versy,"  and this provision does limit the kinds of claims that can be heard in
court.
136  Without  some kind of cause of action-with  a purely ideological
133  See id. at  1784 ("The injury of which respondents  complain--their  failure to obtain
relevant information-is injury of a kind the FECA seeks to address ...  ).
134  See Lee  A. Albert, Standing  to Challenge  Administrative Action:  An Inadequate  Sur-
rogate  for Claim  for Relief,  83 YALE L.J. 425, 492 (1974) (suggesting that the standing ques-
tion  is not injury  in fact,  but cause of action);  David P. Currie,  Misunderstanding  Standing,
1981  Sup.  CT.  REV. 41,  42 (same); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of  Standing, 98 YALE
L.J.  221,  229  (1988)  (arguing  that standing  should  not require  injury  in  fact);  Richard  B.
Stewart,  The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.  1669,  1737-39
(1975)  (discussing the problems  of injury in fact when the injury is to an ideological interest).
Man7 authorities to this effect are collected in Fletcher, supra, at 223 n.18.
Specifically, the test is an outgrowth of Association of  Data Processing  Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).  The origins of the test lay in the 1958 treatise by Professor Ken-
neth Culp Davis.  See 3  KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADmINISTRATiVE  LAW TREATiSE § 22.02, at
211-13  (1958)  (arguing that as a matter of elementary justice, "one who  is in fact hurt by  ille-
gal action should have a remedy").
136  See U.S. CONST.  art. Il.
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objection  or  complaint-there  is  no  "case"  or  "controversy"  within  the
meaning of Article  III.  It follows that courts cannot hear objections  unac-
companied  by some kind of legal right to initiate suit.  But both before  and
after ratification, legislatures-including the very first Congress-gave citi-
zens  and  taxpayers  causes  of action  in  certain  circumstances,  and  these
causes of action were not thought to violate Article III.137  The injury in fact
test has its roots not in the founding period, but in New Deal era cases, and
did  not take Article  III form until  about  1970.138  As a matter of text and
history, the best reading of the Constitution  is that no one can sue without
some kind of cause of action.  An injury in fact, however, is neither a neces-
sary nor a sufficient condition for standing.
There are  problems with the injury in fact test even if we put text and
history to one side.  The test was originally designed to simplify the stand-
ing inquiry by separating  the issue of standing  and the merits,139 but it has
actually produced  extremely complex and unwieldy threshold issues of fact,
ill  suited  to judicial  resolution-involving,  for  example,  the  question  of
how, exactly, fuel economy standards alter the mix of available automobiles
for consumers. 14   But a more important problem with the injury in fact idea
is  conceptual:  the test is not even coherent.1 41  The basic  difficulty is that
many people suffer injuries "in fact" every day, but these injuries do not be-
137  See Raoul Berger, Standing  to Sue in Public  Actions:  Is It a Constitutional  Require-
ment?, 78 YALE L.J. 816,  817 (1969)  (arguing that the English precursor of standing "did not
in fact demand injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite");  Louis L. Jaffe, Standing  to Se-
cure Judicial  Review:  Public Actions, 74 HARV. L.  REV.  1265,  1265 (1961)  (reviewing the
common  law  development  of public  actions  to protect  public interests  and  contrasting  the
limitations that  standing places  on these  actions);  Cass R.  Sunstein,  What's Standing  After
Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,  " and  Article 111, 91  MICH. L. REv.  163,  176 (1992)  (dis-
cussing  evidence  that "Article  IH  did not  impose  constraints  on Congress'  power to grant
standing to strangers"); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of  Standing  and  the Problem of  Self-
Governance, 40  STAN.  L.  REV.  1371,  1395  (1988)  (suggesting that in  early  Supreme  Court
jurisprudence,  the Court did not recognize a cause of action in terms of  "standing,"  but rather
in formalistic terms).
A  competing  view of the  history  is provided  in  Bradley  S.  Clanton,  Standing and the
English Prerogative Writs,  63  BROOK.  L.  REV.  1001  (1997).  I  cannot  discuss  Professor
Clanton's  valuable  treatment here; note,  however,  that even  if he  is  correct  on  eighteenth-
centui  law, the early American practice argues against any "injury in fact" requirement.
See Sunstein, supra  note  137, at 179-81  (providing a historical overview of standing
duri1g the New Deal).
See Camp, 397 U.S. at 153  (distinguishing between the legal interest test, which goes
to the merits, and the question of standing).
140  See Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas,  806 F.2d  1071,  1075 (D.C. Cir. 1986)  (holding
that as a membership organization, the petitioners had standing because they sought to protect
the interests of their members in the choice of the most fuel efficient vehicles).
141  See Fletcher, supra  note  134, at 221  (stating that "[t]he  structure of standing law in
the federal courts has long been criticized as incoherent").
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come legally cognizable, and are not even visible to the legal system, unless
and until some source of law creates a relevant legal interest and a right to
bring suit.  The legal system  does not "see"  an injury unless some  law has
made  it qualify  as such.  If this  point seems  obscure, it is only because  of
widespread  agreement,  within  the  legal  culture,  about  which  injuries  are
"injuries  in fact"  and which are not.  But the agreement comes from under-
standings of law, not understandings of fact.
Thus, for example, if a citizen sought information from the government
in  1956  and even claimed  that his  request involved  "the right to  informa-
tion,"  his  complaint would have  seemed purely  ideological,  and he would
not have had standing.  It is only  after the passage  of FOIA that there is a
legal claim and hence an injury (in fact?) that is the basis for a federal cause
of action.  If a woman sued for sexual harassment in 1958, her injury would
seem purely  ideological  and would not support  a federal  action; things are
altogether  different in  1999.  Can it possibly be  suggested that the "facts"
have changed?  If someone was turned down for a job in  1954 because  of
his skin color and complained about the rejection in court, there would have
been no possible basis  for a lawsuit.  Things changed  in 1964.142  The rea-
son is not that the facts are different; it is the law that has changed.  The line
between  injuries  in fact  and "other"  injuries is usually clear,  and it cannot
possibly  be one involving just "facts";  it necessarily  involves  the require-
ments of law.
To say this is to say that under Article III,  an injury in fact is not an in-
telligible basis for standing.  Something involving a violation of the law is
required.  But-it might be asked-is  not an  injury in fact  a necessary  or
minimal  condition  for standing, as the  Court has suggested  in many cases
since  1980?143  The most important problem with this  question is that it is
hard to know what the question means.  For the question to  be a sensible
one,  we would have to be  able to think that there  is  a way,  entirely  inde-
pendent of law, of figuring  out whether a litigant has been "injured"  at all.
Some cases may seem quite easy on this count.  If I sue to prevent the gov-
ernment from taking my land, surely I have been injured "in fact."  If I am
an Illinois citizen and sue to prevent racial discrimination in North Carolina,
a state that  I never  visit, surely  my  interest  is purely  ideological.  These
142  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)  (detailing the provisions of the Equal Employment Op-
portunities Act).
143  See, e.g.,  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)  (requiring  injury
in  fact as an element of standing);  Sierra Club v. Morton,  405  U.S. 727, 740-41 n.16 (1972)
(citing I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,  DEMOCRACY  IN AMERIcA 280 (Phillips Bradley  ed., A.A.
Knopf 1945)  (1835)),  for the assertion that "judicial review  is effective  largely because  it is
not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a par-
ticular, concrete injury").
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cases seem to suggest that common sense, or ordinary perceptions,  can tell
us whether someone  has really, or "in fact,"  been injured, quite apart from
the law.
But this conclusion is much too quick.  "Injuries"  are not some kind  of
Platonic form,  so that we  can  distinguish, without the  aid of some under-
standing of law, between those that exist "in fact" and those that do not exist
"in fact."  What is perceived,  socially  or legally,  as an "actual"  injury is a
product of social or  legal categories  giving names  and recognition to some
things that people, prominently people within the legal culture,  consider to
be (actual,  cognizable) harms.  Takings cases,  and cases involving  Illinois
citizens  suing about discrimination in North Carolina, seem easy, and they
are, but this is only because the relevant legal understandings are so deeply
internalized that they appear to be mere "common sense."  That these cases
are easy  is a tribute to the agreed-upon nature  of the relevant legal under-
standings; it is not a product of any simple or law-free understanding of the
"facts."  The only way to distinguish between cognizable and noncognizable
injuries is to see what the law says, or is; there is no prepolitical or prelegal
way of making that distinction.
14 4
2.  The Akins Reformulation
Thus far these objections  seem  to run  counter to  the whole thrust  of
modem standing doctrine.  But the Court has shown unambiguous signs  of
acknowledging this point.145  The Akins Court was  alert to these problems
and indeed seems to have taken the injury in fact test in a new, and far more
productive, direction.
Note first that the Court seems to meld the injury in fact inquiry with
the inquiry into what the law is:  "The  'injury in fact' that respondents  have
suffered  consists of their inability to obtain information...  that, on respon-
144  A hard  case for this proposition would be created  if Congress  said that anyone  may
sue  for any  acts of unlawful  racial  discrimination  anywhere.  Would this  not be  a  case  of
someone being given  standing,  or a legal right, when  she had no  injury in fact?  I think that
this question, meant to be rhetorical,  is too simple; relevant discussion  can be found infra, at
Part IV.E.
145  See,  for example, Lujan, where  the Court,  in introducing the  standing requirements,
said that "the plaintiff must have  suffered an 'injury  in fact'-an invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest."  504 U.S.  at 560 (emphasis  added).  See also International  Primate Protec-
lion League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500  U.S. 72  (1991),  where the  Court
said that "standing is gauged  by  the specific  common-law, statutory or constitutional  claims
that a party  presents,"  and noted that standing "should  be seen as  a question of substantive
law, answerable by reference to the statutory  and constitutional provision whose protection  is
invoked."  Id. at 77 (quoting Fletcher, supra  note 134, at 229).
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dents'  view of the  law,  the statute  requires  that  AIPAC  make  public."'146
This formulation unambiguously mixes the injury in fact inquiry with an in-
quiry into the content of the law.  The Court does not refer merely to an in-
ability to  obtain information;  it  refers to an inability  to  obtain information
that must, under the relevant law, be made public.  Here is a suggestion that
without FECA, it is not clear that there would  be a legally cognizable  "in-
jury."
The point emerges  even more straightforwardly  from the Akins Court's
treatment of United States v. Richardson, 147 where it is made clear that the
injury  in  fact  question  would  be  assessed  by  reference  to  positive  law,
whether  statutory  or  constitutional.  If  the  citizens  in  Richardson had
claimed standing qua citizens, the legal issue  "would have rested  in signifi-
cant  part  upon  the  Court's  view  of the  Accounts  Clause."148   Quoting
Richardson, the Court said that there would thus be an issue  "whether 'the
Framers...  ever  imagined  that  general  directives  [of  the  Constitu-
tion] ...  would be subject to enforcement by an individual  citizen. ' 149  In
other words, Akins was different from Richardson: in Akins, Congress had
expressly said that the widely diffused  interest could be enforced  by indi-
vidual  litigants, whereas  in Richardson, it was not at all clear that the rele-
vant source of law (the Constitution)  said that the relevant, widely diffused
injury could be enforced by individual  litigants.  Whether there was  injury
"in fact" depended on what had been provided "in law."
This is a striking way to understand  the inquiry into "injury in fact."  It
suggests unambiguously that whether a perceived harm is legally cognizable
depends not on facts, but on law.  If a denial of citizen standing was appro-
priate  in Richardson, it was  not because  there was no injury  "in  fact,"  but
because  there was no injury  in law-that  is, because no source of law cre-
ated a right to bring suit.  This suggestion is compatible with several prom-
ising pronouncements  in previous  cases.150  In Lujan itself, the Court said
that part of the injury in fact test involved  whether a "legally  cognizable"
interest was involved. 51
I  conclude that the principal  question after Akins, for purposes  of "in-
jury in fact,"  is whether Congress or any other source of law gives  the  liti-
146  Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins,  118 S. Ct. 1777,  1784 (1998).
147  418 U.S. 166 (1974).
148  Akins,  118  S. CL at 1785.
149  Id. (quoting Richardson,  418 U.S. at 178 n.1 1) (alteration in original).
150  See,  e.g., Air Courier Conference  v. American  Postal Workers  Union,  498  U.S.  517,
523  (1991)  (stating that in order to sue under the  APA, one must establish that she has  suf-
fered a legal wrong as the result of an agency's action).
151  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,  578 (1992)  (affirming the principle
that only "legally  cognizable injuries" satisfy the requirements of Article III).
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gant a right to bring suit.
152  Previous cases suggest that there are limits on
Congress's power to grant standing to people who have sustained no "injury
in fact,"153 and these cases have not been overruled by Akins.  But at least
where the plaintiff seeks information,  and where Congress has created a le-
gal interest  and a right to bring suit, the Constitution  does not stand as  an
obstacle.  This is, to say the least, a major development in the law of infor-
mational standing.  It is also a promising  development,  because it puts the
standing question in the hands of Congress, where  it belongs.  And even if
this  statement  is  controversial  in  its broadest  form-applying  outside the
context of information15 4_it  should not be controversial  in a case in which
Congress  expressly gives people  a right to  receive information  and allows
them to bring suit to vindicate that right in court.
B.  Generalized  Grievances
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Akins decision is the Court's
novel understanding  of the  old idea that "generalized  grievances"  are  not
subject to judicial protection.  Before Akins, it was fair to say that the ban on
generalized grievances  was moving from a prudential  one to one rooted in
Article 111.155  Lujan seemed to suggest that to have standing, citizens would
have to show that their injuries were "particular"  in the sense that they were
not widely shared. 156  This was the view defended in an influential  law re-
152  See United  States House of Representatives  v. United States Dep't of Commerce,  11
F. Supp.  2d 76,  85 (D.D.C.  1998);  Judicial  Watch, Inc. v. Federal  Election  Comm'n,  10 F.
Supp%  2d 39, 41 (D.D.C. 1998).
3 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at  576-77  (rejecting  the proposition that  courts act  as pseudo-
legislatures by accepting  cases without a person suffering "distinctive concrete harm");  Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972)  ("The requirement that a party seeking review must
allege facts showing  that he is himself adversely affected  does not  insulate executive  action
from judicial review, nor does it prevent any public interests from being protected through the
judicial process.").
154  I do not suggest that Akins overrules Lujan insofar as the latter case requires an injury
in fact.  All that is clear is that afterAkins, a deprivation of information consists of an injury in
fact if Congress  has  said so.  The tension  between Akins  and Lujan stems  from  the Akins
Court's recognition that whether there is an injury depends on what Congress has said, and its
clear indication that Congress has the power to create new interests  and new injuries.  It re-
mains to be seen whether and how Akins alters Lujan's apparent belief that "injury"  is a kind
of Platonic form, existing above and apart from the law.  For a quite extreme example of the
Platonic  form view of standing law,  see Animal Legal Defense Fund,  Inc. v. Glickman,  154
F.3d 426, 445-50  (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sentelle,  J., dissenting).
155  See  Lujan, 504  U.S.  at  573-74  (stating that  making  a generalized  grievance  claim
against the government "does not state an Article III  case or controversy").
156  See  id. at 574-75  (quoting with approval Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429,
433-34 (1952), which stated that "to invoke the judicial power...  it is not sufficient that [the
citizen] has merely a general interest common to all members of  the public").
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view article by then-Judge Scalia, which Lujan appeared to follow. 57  The
article  urged  that the distinctive  role of the  courts  is  to protect  individual
rights,  and that when numerous  people  are  being  injured,  their  remedy  is
political rather than judicial.  This claim was bottomed, in turn, on the idea
that the distinctive role of the courts is to vindicate rights held by individu-
als, rather than majorities or large groups.158  There were many suggestions,
in the lower courts as well as the Supreme  Court, that prudential  or consti-
tutional considerations counseled  against  standing for those whose injuries
were  not individuated. 59  These suggestions  were  especially  important in
cases  involving  information,  since the  interest  in receiving  information  is
often widely shared-sometimes, in fact, shared by millions  of citizens, as
in the typical deprivation of information suit under FECA.
The Akins Court makes what reasonably  could be considered  either an
important clarification  or a dramatic  shift.  After Akins, the fact that an in-
jury is generalized is not a barrier to standing under Article III.  Congress is
entirely authorized to grant standing to individuals who share an injury with
many other people,  even with all  citizens.  Akins  reads the  references to
generalized grievances  in connection with  the requirement that injuries  be
concrete rather than abstract.  Concreteness, the Court says, is indeed a con-
stitutional requirement.  Injuries must not be speculative.  But an injury that
is both concrete and generalized  is constitutionally cognizable.
1 6 0
Frequently,  this  is  the case with a denial  of information.  The  person
who has been denied information suffers a concrete harm, even though she
may be part of an extremely large class of people.  As we have seen, this is
the point  where  Justice  Scalia departed,  with  some alarm,  from the Akins
majority, on the theory that any injury must be both concrete and "particu-
larized" in the sense that it must be distinct to the complaining individual.'16
Frequently, a plaintiff seeking information would run afoul of this require-
157  See Scalia, supra  note  131,  at 881-82 (1983)  ("I  suggest that  courts  need to accord
greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional requirement that the plaintiff's
alleged injury be a particularized  one, which sets him apart from the citizenry at large.").
158  See id. at 894-97  (arguing  that "the  law of standing  roughly  restricts courts to their
traditional undemocratic  role  of protecting individuals  and minorities  against impositions  of
the majority").
15  See, e.g.,  United  States v.  Richardson,  418  U.S.  166,  179-80  (1974)  (stating that  a
citizen who is not satisfied with a congressional ruling can  resort to the electoral  process  as a
remedy, and that there is a "basic  principle that to invoke judicial  power the claimant  must
have a 'personal stake  in the outcome,'  or a 'particular, concrete  injury,'  or 'a direct injury'
(citations omitted)).
160  See  Federal  Election Comm'n  v. Akins,  118  S.  Ct.  1777,  1786  (1998)  ("[W]here  a
harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found 'injury  in fact."').
161  See id. at 1791  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting) (stressing the importance  of a "particularized"
injury).
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ment, for often those deprived of information are not injured in a way that is
(in Justice Scalia's particular sense) particular.
What, then,  remains  of the  supposed  ban  on generalized  grievances?
Very little-but not nothing.  The Court says that the fact that an injury is
widely  shared,  and hence  the political  forum  is  available,  will  "counsel[]
against...  interpreting  a statute as  conferring standing."162  Hence, the no-
tion is retained as a prudential one, and as we will see, it may turn out to be
quite important as such, in information cases and in others.163
Now,  it would be possible to suggest that Akins eliminates  the "gener-
alized grievance"  requirement  entirely and focuses solely on injury in fact.
The  Court's use of the mass tort case-in which numerous people  are af-
fected,  but each  has standing-might be taken as  indicative  of a move  in
this direction.  In the mass tort case, however, many people are affected,  but
each in a particular and concrete way.  A more serious question  is whether
the same  is true  when thousands  or millions of people are  deprived  of in-
formation.  It is not easy to answer that question in the abstract.  Perhaps a
deprivation  of information  (involving,  for example,  television  ratings) af-
fects  each  individual  particularly  and  concretely.  But the  Court  should
probably  be taken at its word with its suggestion that a widely generalized
injury is not cognizable if Congress has not expressly said that it is.
An  especially  narrow reading of Akins  would fasten  on the following
sentence:  "We  conclude  that  similarly,  the  informational  injury  at issue
here,  directly  related to  voting, the most basic of political rights,  is  suffi-
ciently concrete  and specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does
not deprive Congress of constitutional  power to authorize  its vindication  in
the federal courts." 164  A future court could possibly read Akins as crucially
about information directly  related to  voting.  Such a court could plausibly
say that the Akins Court allowed standing  for  citizens  asserting a general-
ized grievance only because, and to the extent that, the injury involved "the
most basic of political rights."
The first question  here is obvious:  Was  the Court correct to  say that
Article III poses no barrier to those who have grievances that are both con-
crete and widely shared?  As a matter of text and history, the Court's con-
clusion is unimpeachable; there is no constitutional  barrier to judicial recog-
nition of legally authorized claims  asserted by citizens whose  interests  are
widely shared.165  Generalized  grievances were recognized  in both England
162  Id.  at 1786.
163  See infra  notes 209-41  and accompanying text.
164  Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1786.
165  See Berger, supra  note  137, at 816, 840 ("mhe notion that the constitution demands
injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite to attacks on  allegedly unconstitutional  action is
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and America,  where,  as we  have  seen, citizen  and taxpayer  standing  was
permitted. 166  Even  if it were possible  to generate  from text and  history a
constitutional  requirement  of an  "injury,"  such  a requirement  would  not
stand  as an obstacle to suits by people who suffer along with many others.
Such people have injuries, too; they  are not mere bystanders,  and they  are
not complaining about violations of law as such.  Thus the Court's conclu-
sion that widely generalized injuries are cognizable is right even if we agree
that some "injury in fact" test is constitutional in character.
In both judicial and nonjudicial writing, Justice Scalia has defended the
ban on generalized grievances  not by reference  to text and history, but in-
stead by invoking considerations of policy and structure.167  In his view, the
ban stems from an understanding of the distinctive role of the judiciary in a
democratic  society.  Courts  properly  protect  individuals,  or  members  of
small groups, against governmental  illegality.  But when injuries are widely
shared, the victims can and should use the political process, not the courts,
for  they  have  (by hypothesis)  sufficient  political  voice  to  resort to  their
democratic  remedies.  In the context of information, the argument would be
that if government is refusing to regulate (for example) AIPAC as a political
committee,  and thus refusing to require  it to disclose  relevant information,
then a large number of people are harmed.  They should have enough politi-
cal influence to be able to pressure the FEC and Congress to respond.  That
is the appropriate arena for their claims, not the judiciary.
As a matter of political science, this is not an entirely implausible set of
generalizations;  a large  group certainly  has more access to political  reme-
dies than  a small one,  other things  being  equal.  But the generalization  is
crude.  Whether it is  right depends  on a number of variables, including the
information  and the organizational  capacity  of the relevant group members,
who may face serious collective action problems.168  Return here to a basic
reason for statutes requiring information disclosure and indeed for grants of
standing in public law cases:  when a large group of people is denied  infor-
historically unfounded."); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial  Review:  Public Actions,
74 HARV.  L.  REV.  1265,  1307-14  (1961)  (explaining that  the  Constitution  does  not bar  a
shared interest suit).  See generally Winter, supra  note  137, at  1418-25 (explaining  the onto-
logical development of the term "standing").
166  See  Sunstein,  supra note  137,  at  171  ("In both  England  and  America,  actions  by
strangers,  or by citizens in general, were  fully permissible and indeed familiar.");  Winter, su-
pra  note 137, at 1441-57 (describing constitutional  standing).
167  See Akins,  118  S.  Ct. at 1791-92  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting)  (arguing that such  suits un-
dermine  the  powers of the  Chief Executive);  Scalia, supra note  131,  894-97  (arguing  that
courts should not be political instruments).
168  See generally  RUSSELL  HARDIN, COLLECTiVE ACTION  6-9 (1982)  (analyzing  collec-
tive action  problems);  MANCUR  OLSON,  THE  LOGIC  OF  COLLECTIvE  ACTION  1-2  (2d ed.
1971)  (explaining that without a coercive  force,  groups may not take steps to advance  their
common or group interests).
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mation, many or most of them may not know that they have been harmed;
and even if they know, any particular member-say,  member A-may not
consider  it worthwhile to participate in the relevant political  activity.  This
is  especially  so  in light of the  fact that nothing  is likely to  happen unless
other members act, in which case little will be added by the participation of
member A.  With respect to information in particular, the free rider problem
is  likely to  make  political  remedies  insufficient,  even  or especially  when
large  numbers  of people have been deprived  of information  to which they
have a legal right.
Justice Scalia's argument is basically one from democracy:  when many
people are  injured, they should use the democratic  process, not the courts.
But as a claim from democracy, the argument is weak.  The most basic dif-
ficulty is that Congress  has,  by hypothesis, concluded  that the agency  (or
private defendant) is not entirely reliable on its own and that relevant people
should have access to the courts in order to ensure that the (democratically
enacted) law is enforced.  If Congress has made that judgment, then there
should be no (democratic) problem  with allowing that kind of enforcement
of the statutory directive.  If Congress has given anyone the right to ensure
disclosure of campaign-related information,  it is because Congress was con-
cerned  that the  FEC  would  not adequately  enforce  the  law,  and because
Congress believed  that a right to  challenge  FEC  decisions  in court would
increase the likelihood  of good outcomes.  Perhaps that judgment was  un-
wise; perhaps citizen suits cause more trouble than they are worth.  But that
would be a policy problem, not a constitutional one.
1 69
There is also nothing in Article II that argues  against allowing standing
for people who suffer a widely  shared injury.  To be sure, it is for the Ex-
ecutive, not the courts, to "take Care" that the laws are  faithfully executed.
In these  cases,  however, the plaintiffs'  allegation  is that the Executive  has
failed in that task.  In order to prevail, the plaintiffs  must overcome a sub-
stantial burden by showing (to simplify a complex story) that the agency has
violated an unambiguous statute170 or has behaved  in an arbitrary or capri-
cious manner. 171  It does no violence to Article II for a court to hear a plain-
169  There  is a difference  here between  standing  in  constitutional  cases and  standing  in
administrative law cases.  Perhaps courts should be cautious in allowing citizens to invoke the
Constitution to challenge the outcomes of the democratic process.  Even if this is so, however,
there is far less reason for courts to be cautious in allowing people to invoke statutes to chal-
lenge the outcomes of the administrative process.
170  See Chevron U.S.A.  Inc. v. Natural Resources  Defense  Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43  (1984) ("If the  intent of Congress  is clear, ...  the court,  as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
171  See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994)  (mandating that the reviewing court "hold unlawful
and set aside agency action ...  found to be ...  arbitrary  [or] capricious").
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tiff s complaint to this effect and to rule against the Executive if it is shown
that the agency has, in fact, violated the law.
C. Redressability
With respect to redressability, the Court proceeded with an analogy that
operated  as a kind of reductio ad absurdwn.  With  some  incredulity,  the
Court indicated that if this injury was not redressable, then the same would
be true of countless complaints in countless administrative law cases, where
agencies might also end up rejecting the plaintiffs'  complaints  after remand.
The point is correct;  the logic of the government's redressability  argument
might well have this extraordinary consequence.
It also seems  clear that Akins marks a noteworthy  clarification  of pre-
existing law.  The prior cases 172 seemed to suggest that standing should not
be permitted if there is any nontrivial reason to think that a discretionary de-
cision, by  the agency  or a private  party,  might prevent  the  plaintiff from
obtaining the requested relief.  In Akins, this idea is rejected;  standing exists
even in the face of a substantial possibility that the agency  would exercise
its discretion to the plaintiffs detriment.  We might even say that after Ak-
ins, the redressability requirement  is unlikely to matter in the administrative
law context,  at least where the exercise  of agency discretion  on remand is
what makes the remedy "speculative."'
1 73
But the  Court's explanation  nonetheless  leaves  a good  deal to  be de-
sired.  Under the Court's existing redressability  cases,  it has yet to be ex-
plained  why, in principle,  there is no serious  problem  in conventional  ad-
ministrative law cases.  We know that there is no such problem;  we do not
know why.
To be more concrete:  the Court made clear that Article III requires the
plaintiff to show that a decree in his favor will remedy his asserted injury.  It
must not be "speculative"  whether the decree would do so.  In Linda R.S. v.
172  See Allen v.  Wright, 468  U.S. 737  (1984),  Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organi-
zation v. Simon, 426 U.S. 26  (1976),  and Linda R.S. v. Richard  D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973),  dis-
cussed infra, at notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
173  See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman,  154 F.3d 426, 445-49 (D.C. Cir.
1998)  (Sentelle, J., dissenting).  Akins does not disturb previous law insofar as it is focused on
the exercise of discretion by a private party.  See Allen v. Wright, 468  U.S. 737  (1984)  (exer-
cise of discretion by private schools); Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 426 U.S. 26
(1976)  (exercise of discretion by nonprofit hospitals); Linda R1S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973)  (exercise  of discretion by parent).  But it is  not clear, on the Court's view, why this
should make a substantial difference.  I suggest below that the different results really turn  on
the statutory  interpretation-that is, on an understanding  of Congress's instructions under the
relevant statute.
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Richard  D., 174 for example, the mother of a child born out of wedlock chal-
lenged the local prosecutor's  failure to bring proceedings against her child's
father for failure to  pay child  support.  The Court denied  standing  on the
ground that even if the prosecutor initiated proceedings, the father might not
pay.175  So, too, in Simon v. Eastern  Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
("EKWRO"), where indigent individuals, denied emergency services in local
hospitals,  brought suit against the Internal  Revenue  Service  challenging  a
new policy that allowed hospitals to claim a charitable  deduction after pro-
viding  fewer  emergency  services  to  the  indigent.176   The  Court  denied
standing on  the ground that it was possible  that even if the charitable  de-
duction had been unchanged,  services  might have been denied.177  Thus,  a
decree in the plaintiffs'  favor  would not have prevented or redressed  their
injuries.  In both cases, the Court seemed concerned that a grant of standing
would have allowed a kind of advisory opinion.
The problem  here  is that  many conventional  administrative  law  cases
seem  to  have  precisely  the  same  difficulty;  there  is  no  assurance  that  a
plaintiff will ultimately  receive  what he wants  even if he succeeds  on the
issue at hand.  Thus, for  example, if a plaintiff complains  that the agency
failed to give an adequate explanation  for a rule, there is no assurance that
on remand,  the agency  will  not come  up with exactly the same  rule  after
justifying itself adequately.  The plaintiffs victory may not result in an out-
come in his favor.  The central question, unanswered  in Akins, is this:  Why,
then, do the redressability requirements not create problems in ordinary  ad-
ministrative law cases?
The beginning of an answer may seem to lay in a controversial  expla-
nation in the Lujan opinion, consisting chiefly of a footnote'78  in which the
Court suggested  that the  redressability  requirements  would  be  relaxed  in
174  410 U.S. 614 (1973).
175  See id. at 619 (holding that the mother lacked standing since  she had not shown that
the prosecution of  the father would vindicate her interest).
176  426 U.S. 26 (1976).
1  See id. at 42-43  ("It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified  in
the complaint fairly can be traced  to petitioner's 'encouragement'  or instead result from deci-
sions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.").  See also Allen, 468 U.S.
737, where the Court  denied standing to parents  of black children  attending public schools
undergoing desegregation.  The plaintiffs attempted to challenge the grant of tax deductions to
segregated public schools.  The Court held that the denial of the tax deduction would not nec-
essarily  affect  the plaintiffs.  See id. at 758  ("[I]t is  entirely  speculative...  whether  with-
drawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to change its poli-
cies.").  After Akins, both EKWRO and Allen might be seen as cases in which Congress did
not  create standing;  as a matter of construction of the Internal  Revenue  Code, third parties
usually lack standing to litigate the tax liability of others.
178  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
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some  cases involving a "procedural  injury,"  such as where  a plaintiff com-
plains of the failure to  prepare  an EIS.  Standing  is  available  if plaintiffs
"are  seeking to  enforce  a procedural  requirement  the  disregard  of which
could  impair  a separate  concrete  interest  of theirs." 179  It  is  true  that the
mere  preparation of an  EIS need not have favorable consequences  for any
plaintiff; the agency may prepare the statement and go ahead with its plans
undaunted.  But if a concrete recreational or health interest "lies behind" the
complaint, then this fact is not fatal to standing by a NEPA plaintiff.  Thus
the Court said that a "person who has been accorded  a procedural  right to
protect his  concrete  interests  can  assert that right without  meeting all  the
normal standards for redressability and immediacy."'18 0  This was essentially
the logic that the Court followed in Akins, without citing the Lujan sugges-
tion.  And we can  agree that the redressability requirements  should not be
taken to forbid people from complaining about procedural violations that are
connected with  injuries to their legally  cognizable  interests.  But the ques-
tion remains:  Why is this so?
The  best response  has to  do  with the nature  of procedural  rights and
their distinctive  relation to the question  of redressability.  When  Congress
creates  a procedural  right, it does so not because  the right will  necessarily
lead to particular results, but instead because  procedural rights create desir-
able  structures,  incentives,  and  increased  or decreased  probabilities-and
also  because  they  increase the  legitimacy  of any government  interference
with  substantive  rights.  In Congress's apparent view, those structures,  in-
centives, and probabilities tend to produce outcomes that are better or more
fair.  This is the underlying logic of the brief analysis in Lujan; NEPA is de-
signed not to require  particular results, but to structure processes  in a way
that will increase the likelihood  of good or fair decisions.  Once properly
characterized-as  involving a right to certain procedures rather than certain
outcomes-the  statutory  injury would  be redressed.  When  a court  holds
that an agency has not complied with NEPA and requires the preparation of
an  EIS,  the court  has redressed  the plaintiffs NEPA-related  injury.  That
injury does not consist of an environmental  injury alone, or even at all; the
injury consists of the failure to provide the beneficiaries  of NEPA with the
procedural protections (and agency  incentives) created by that statute.  The
key point here  is that we  cannot know  whether  the redressability  require-
ments are met without properly  characterizing  the relevant injury,  and the
only basis for a proper characterization is the statute.  NEPA gives rise to a
179  Id. at 572.
180  Id.
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new and distinctive set of injuries, and those injuries are precisely redressed
through a mandate that agencies prepare (legally required) EISs.
A similar situation arises with the campaign finance  law in Akins.  Per-
haps the agency would decide,  on remand, to exercise  its discretion  not to
challenge AIPAC, but at least it would be doing so as an exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion and not on the basis of what would be (by hypothesis) an
illegitimate  interpretation  of FECA.  A central  point of the APA  arrange-
ment for judicial  review of administrative  action is to  ensure that agencies
proceed both publicly and on the basis of legitimate reasons.  The plaintiffs
in Akins alleged that the FEC misinterpreted the relevant law,  and the rele-
vant injury-government  inaction  threatening  to  their  statutory  rights  in
their capacity  as  citizens,  based on that  misinterpretation-would  be ade-
quately  redressed  by a decision  in their favor.  The general  conclusion  is
that characterization  of the injury  comes  from the governing  statute.  This
conclusion cuts  across standing doctrine and indeed applies  in information
cases quite broadly.
The point incidentally  explains  why  Justice  Scalia was  able to  attract
only a plurality on the redressability question in Lujan itself. There, the plu-
rality concluded that the plaintiffs, challenging federal  funding of an inter-
national project that threatened certain endangered species, should be denied
standing  because  they  could  not show  that  the  denial  of federal  funding
would save any endangered species.1 8 1  The plurality noted that even if the
plaintiffs  prevailed,  and the  Secretary  of the Interior  determined  that  the
funding was unlawful, the funding agencies might not change their behav-
ior.  The Court also noted that American agencies provide only a part of the
funding for the relevant foreign projects and hence a denial of federal funds
182 might not save the relevant species.  If the plurality's reasoning  is right,
then the redressability reasoning of the Akins Court is probably wrong.  But
the plurality's reasoning is not right.  Insofar as the Endangered Species Act
forbids the use of federal funds to jeopardize the continued existence of en-
dangered species, its purpose is not necessarily to preserve endangered  spe-
cies (an outcome that depends not only  on federal  funding or even federal
action),  but to ensure that the American  government does not take  actions
that contribute to their elimination.  The injury that the plaintiffs sought to
address was the increased probability of extinction that would be created  by
the unlawful use of federal funds.
181  See id. at 571 (stating that "[r]espondents  have produced nothing to indicate  that the
projects  they have named will either be suspended, or do less harm  to listed  species,  if that
fraction is eliminated").
182  See id. (noting that the agency provided less than 10% of the funding).
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If the injury is understood in these terms, the redressability requirement
is met by showing that if the plaintiff prevailed, then the funds would not be
used  in the  unlawful  manner.  The  six justices  who joined  the  majority
opinion in Akins straightforwardly  have rejected the four-person  opinion in
Lujan. These  claims  about  redressability  are  closely  related  to  the claims
about injury in fact offered above.  Both injury in fact and redressability are
crude ways of getting at the central question:  What kind of injury is created
by the relevant source of law?
There  is an important corollary.  When a plaintiff seeking to attack an
institution  objects to an  unlawful expenditure  of federal funds-involving,
for example, schools that discriminate  on the basis of race or sex-standing
is  available  even  though  a withdrawal  of funds  may  not prevent  the  dis-
crimination.  The injury consists of the increased probability or dimensions
of discrimination by virtue of government  funding, or of the use of federal
funds to subsidize  discrimination; that injury would be redressed by the de-
cree the plaintiff seeks.
183
These points help sort out the whole area of procedural  injuries.  When
a concrete interest lies behind a procedural violation, a plaintiff has standing
to  bring  suit, even if the  agency,  after  complying  with  applicable  proce-
dures, might not give the plaintiff the relief he seeks  or might proceed on a
course  that the plaintiff dislikes.  For  purposes  of informational  standing,
the course for the future is therefore clear.  Even if an agency might not pro-
ceed  against  a third  party  to require  disclosure  of information,  a plaintiff
with congressional  authorization  has  standing  to  object  to  the procedures
that the agency  followed in choosing that course.  This is  not because the
redressability requirements  are  "relaxed"  in procedural  cases  (as the Lujan
Court would have it), but because the injury, properly characterized  in light
of the underlying  (procedural)  law, would be redressed  by a decree in the
plaintiff's favor (consider NEPA and funding cases above as examples).
These  answers also help to recast the whole  idea of redressability,  cer-
tainly, but not only, in cases  involving access to  information.  Whether an
injury is redressable  depends on how it is characterized,  and how it is char-
acterized  depends on the nature of the relevant law.  In procedural cases, a
plaintiff with a concrete interest faces no redressability problem  if the gov-
erning  law also  creates  a legally  cognizable  interest  in the  relevant struc-
tures  and incentives-so, too, with other standing  cases.  Consider, as  Ex-
183  The point suggests that EKWRO and Allen were incorrectly  decided if they are taken
as pure redressability  cases.  But if they are taken  as cases about congressional  instructions,
then they were probably  correct, because Congress  is generally  not understood to allow one
taxpayer to litigate the tax liability of another.
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hibit A, Northeastern Contractors,18 4 in which white construction  contrac-
tors challenged an affirmative  action program, only to meet with the seem-
ingly plausible objection that they could not show that they would have re-
ceived  the  contracts  without  the  affirmative  action  program.  The  Court
responded that this showing was irrelevant; what was important was that the
plaintiffs  had suffered an  injury to an interest protected by the Equal  Pro-
tection Clause-that  is,  the  opportunity  to  compete  on an  equal  basis.185
That injury would have been addressed  by a favorable  decree.  Although I
cannot discuss the point in detail here, I believe that Northeastern Contrac-
tors, together with Akins,  will  eventually  force  a rethinking  of the whole
idea of redressability,  requiring  the  Court to  be  more  explicit  about  the
kinds of "injuries" that it recognizes.1
6
The appropriate  conclusion is that the Akins Court was correct to allow
standing in the face of a redressability challenge, and also that it was correct
to  invoke  the  analogy  of conventional  administrative  law  cases.  But the
correctness  of the result  and of the analogy suggest deeper problems  with
redressability; the problems  have to do with the need to characterize the in-
jury properly.  The proper characterization of the injury turns on the content
of the relevant law, procedural or substantive.
IV.  INJURIES AND INFORMATION IN THE FUTURE
The discussion thus far suggests that the Akins Court was right on each
of the three principal standing issues.187  But larger questions remain.  For
example,  what are  its  implications  for  informational  injury in  the future?
And how does  it bear on standing questions  not involving information  in-
jury at all?
184  Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville,  508
U.S.  656 (1993).
1s5  See  id. at 666 ("The 'injury  in fact'  in an equal protection case  of this variety  is  the
denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier [to compete for benefits],
not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.").
186  See Cass R.  Sunstein, Standing  Injuries,  1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37, for a general discus-
sion on how injuries should be characterized for purposes of  standing.
187  The  Court was also right on the smaller issue, involving interpretation  of the statute.
Justice Scalia's disagreement  was plainly  motivated by his belief that the statute  should  be
construed so as to avoid constitutional doubts.  See Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins,  118 S.
Ct. 1777,  1789-90 (1998)  (Scalia, J.,  dissenting) (urging the Court to adopt a "narrower read-
ing of the phrase 'party  aggrieved"' in order to avoid constitutional doubt).
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A.  Injury in Fact: Mostly Easy Cases
After Akins, there are, with respect to information,  many easy cases.  If
Congress granted standing to citizens in general to seek information and in-
formation  has been withheld, citizens  in general  can  bring suit.  Certainly
this is clear if the information bears directly  on their behavior as voters.  It
seems  equally  clear  if the  information bears  directly  on the plaintiffs'  ac-
tivities in their individual or organizational  capacities.  Suppose, for exam-
ple,  that an individual  or institution  is  interested  in obtaining  information
relating to enforcement  of the Animal  Welfare  Act, and that individual  or
organization  has a demonstrable  interest  in the protection  of animals  from
suffering.  In such cases, standing is clearly available.
The  situation  is  slightly  less  clear  when  an  individual  or institution
seeking  information  invokes  no  interest  expressly  related  to  the political
process and when that individual  or institution  cannot show that the infor-
mation would relate to relevant activities  on his or its part.  The  strongest
argument  for  denying  standing  would  be  that  the  plaintiff  has  a  purely
ideological  interest,  or  an  interest  in  law  enforcement  for  its  own  sake.
Suppose,  for example, that an ordinary, relatively young  citizen  is seeking
information about  compliance with the Age Discrimination  Act.  Suppose
the citizen seeks this information simply because she is curious, or because
she generally wants to make sure that the government is enforcing the law.
It is  possible to  argue that Akins  does not cover this  case.  As stated, the
plaintiff has no particular interest  as  a citizen,  and she  cannot connect the
denial  of information  to  any tangible  activity independent  of the lawsuit.
Thus, there is a plausible basis for denying standing even in light of the out-
come in Akins.
The argument is plausible, but no more than that; a congressional grant
of standing in a case of this kind would probably be constitutional  after Ak-
ins.  (If  there is  no such grant, then standing should probably be denied on
prudential  grounds.) 188  The  first point  is  analogical  and  involves  FOIA.
Under FOIA, anyone can bring suit to obtain any information that FOIA re-
quires to be made public. 89  The plaintiff need not show an interest in using
the information for anything  in particular;  simple curiosity  is enough.  The
denial of the information is the injury  in fact.  No court has held this provi-
sion  unconstitutional.  It  is  hard  to  distinguish  the  countless  imaginable
FOIA cases from the hypothesized case.
188  See the discussion of generalized interests within the zone, infra Part IV.C.
189  See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)  (stating that agency  rules,  opinions, orders,  records,  and
proceedings  are public information).
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The second point involves Akins itself.  The Akins Court could have is-
sued a narrow ruling, saying that when citizens bring suit to obtain informa-
tion directly  involving the political process, there is no constitutional  obsta-
cle to a congressional grant of standing.  As noted, there is some language in
Akins emphasizing  that the case  itself involved voting,  "the  most basic  of
political rights,"'19 0 and it would be possible to seize on this language to con-
fine the  opinion's  reach.  A narrow  understanding  of this  kind, however,
would not be consistent with the spirit of the decision, for the Court spoke
far more generally  about Congress's creation of a legal right to information
and its grant of a right to bring suit to vindicate that interest.  The remark
about "the  most basic of political  rights" was in the nature of an exclama-
tion point, and not in any sense central to the Court's reasoning.
In any case, it would not be sensible, for Article III purposes, to distin-
guish between citizens  seeking information directly bearing  on the political
process  and citizens seeking other kinds of information.  If the question is
whether the plaintiff has suffered injury in fact, then why would that line be
appropriate?  At best, such  a line would  invite  strategic behavior  and  in-
genious pleading;  almost any information can plausibly be characterized  as
bearing  on voting  behavior.  In the  hypothesized  case,  for  example,  the
plaintiff could contend, at least as plausibly as the citizens in Akins, that the
relevant information would bear on her decision about how to vote, and in
what kinds of political  activity to  engage.  Putting the risk of strategic  be-
havior to  one side, nothing  in Article III  supports  the view that  Congress
may create  citizen standing in cases involving denial of information bearing
on the right to vote, but may not do so when voting is not at stake.  Article
III requires  a legal right-if Congress  has created a legal right to informa-
tion, that requirement is satisfied.
I conclude that after Akins, the injury in fact test is not a barrier to  ex-
plicit congressional  grants  of standing  to  citizens  seeking  information  to
which they have a legal right.  The real difficulties lie elsewhere; they have
to do with redressability and with congressional instructions.
B. Redressability: Information,  Bounties, and the U.S. Treasury
Suppose that the government or some private  entity refused to disclose
information,  or suppose that the government failed to require  disclosure  of
information by some third party, either public or private.  Suppose, too, that
the nondisclosure  is unlawful.  If a plaintiff sues to obtain the information,
there is injury in fact, and the plaintiff meets the redressability requirements
under Akins.  Now instead suppose that the information has been disclosed
190  Akins, 118 S.  Ct. at 1786.
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after the filing of the complaint but before the judgment, and that the plain-
tiff seeks  declaratory  relief or the  imposition of monetary  penalties.  The
problem  is far from hypothetical.  Congress  sometimes allows plaintiffs  to
impose financial  burdens  on both  those who have failed to disclose  infor-
mation 1 91 and polluters  (and  others)  who  sometimes  disclose  information
only after  a lawsuit has been threatened  or instituted.  Is there  a standing
problem?
The easiest case for the plaintiff would involve monetary penalties that
would go directly to the plaintiff.  If a plaintiff stands to receive compensa-
tion for information unlawfully withheld, then the case is akin to many con-
ventional  cases in which a plaintiff seeks damages for illegality, and there is
no standing question at all.  If the plaintiff stands to receive a "penalty"  not
representing compensation  but taking the form of a bounty, then the prob-
lem is a little harder, but there should be no problem here either.  A poten-
tial award of a penalty or a bounty would make the case akin to several old
prerogative writs, such as quo warranto, informer's actions, and qui tam ac-
tions. 1 92  In Lujan, the Court suggested that a grant of a bounty to the citi-
zen-plaintiffs  would solve  the constitutional  difficulty,193 and there  is sup-
port for this idea in the qui tam action, as suggested by early congressional
practice and in several Supreme Court decisions.194
Suppose, however, that a plaintiff stands to gain no monetary  relief at
all; suppose that the plaintiff is entitled only to a declaratory judgment, with
appropriate  fines  going to  the U.S.  Treasury.  In a  case of this kind,  the
Court recently held that there can be no informational standing.  Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment involved a complaint, by a public interest
organization,  that  Steel  Company failed  to  disclose  its  toxic  releases,  in
191  See EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)  (1994)  (imposing  civil and administrative  penal-
ties for failing to meet the reporting requirements of EPCRA).
192  See  Sunstein, supra note  137,  at  168-79  (describing  the history  of standing  in  the
English and American systems).
193  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-73  (1992)  (distinguishing Lu-
jan from the simple case where  standing exists because Congress has provided "a cash bounty
for the victorious plaintiff').
194  See, e.g.,  Act of May  19,  1796,  ch. 30,  § 18,  1 Stat. 469, 474 (awarding private citi-
zens bounties for informing  the  U.S. government of violations of the Act);  Act of Mar. 22,
1794, ch.  11,  § 4,  1 Stat. 347, 349 (offering a bounty to persons who prosecute violations  of
the Act); Act of Feb. 20, 1792,  ch. 7, § 25,  1 Stat. 232, 235 (granting one half of the penalties
collected to the person "informing  and prosecuting" the violation); Act of March  3,  1791,  ch.
15, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209 (providing one half of  all penalities collected for violation of the Act
to the person who discovers  the violation);  United  States ex  reL Marcus  v. Hess,  317  U.S.
537,  541 n.4  (1943)  (supporting the  Court's  assertion that  "[q]ui tam suits  have  been  fre-
quently permitted by  legislative action");  Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905)  (assert-
ing the standing of the plaintiffs to sue in qui tam actions).
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plain violation of EPCRA.195  All sides agreed that Steel  Company had not
done what it was legally obliged to do.  Soon after Citizens for a Better En-
vironment sent Steel  Company a statutory notice of intent to sue, however,
the company filed the overdue forms and disclosed the relevant information.
The plaintiff claimed that the statute entitled it to various kinds of "appro-
priate"  relief:  a declaratory judgment that the company violated EPCRA,
civil fines (of $25,000 per day)  that would  be paid to the government,  an
award of costs, and an  order requiring the company  to provide them with
copies of all compliance reports submitted to the EPA. 1 96
Nonetheless, the Court denied standing.  It did not reach the question of
whether "being deprived of information that is supposed to be disclosed un-
der EPCRA-or at least being deprived of it when one has a particular plan
for its use-is a concrete injury in fact that satisfies Article  III."' 97  (Akins
answers  that question affirmatively, though without the approval of Justice
Scalia, who wrote the opinion in Steel Co.)  Instead the Court simply con-
cluded that the plaintiff could not meet the requirements  for redressability.
If the plaintiff won, how, exactly, would its injury be remedied?  The Court
explained that "[n]one  of the specific  items of relief sought,  and none that
we can envision as  'appropriate'  under the general  request, would serve to
reimburse respondent for losses caused by the late reporting, or to eliminate
any effects of that late reporting upon respondent." 198 The result might have
been different if  the civil penalties could be "viewed as a sort of compensa-
tion or redress to" the plaintiff, but the fact that the penalties would go to the
Treasury  suggested that the plaintiff instead  sought "not remediation  of its
own injury..,  but vindication of the rule of law."199
Steel Co. is important because  it suggests a significant  obstacle to in-
formational  standing:  a plaintiff must show not only that there has been a
deprivation  of information,  but also that the plaintiff stands to gain  some-
thing from a decree  in its favor.  To be sure,  it is  reasonable  to doubt the
Court's  decision, which was,  on the constitutional  issue,  quite cavalier.2 00
As a matter of first principles,  or as a matter of constitutional text and his-
tory, why  is  Congress  prohibited  from  concluding that  citizens  who  have
suffered an injury should be allowed to require violators of the law to pay
appropriate penalties to the government?  The history suggests a far broader
195  118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
196  See id. at 1018.
197  Id.
198  Id.
199 Id.
200  See id. at  1027-30 (Stevens,  J., concurring)  (noting the  Court's substantial  departure
from its previous treatment of cases without redressability).
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understanding  of legislative  power.201  Nonetheless,  Steel Co. is  consistent
with the thrust of the Court's recent redressability holdings.  It thus suggests
that a plaintiff seeking information must show that if the suit is successful,
the plaintiff will receive something for its trouble.  If  the plaintiff would re-
ceive the information, there is no problem.  There is  also probably no prob-
lem if the plaintiff would receive  compensation  or a bounty.  If, however,
the plaintiff stands to gain nothing else, standing will be denied.
The  outcome  in Steel Co. was presaged  by an intriguing court of ap-
peals case raising a similar problem of informational standing in a quite dif-
ferent setting.  In Common Cause v. FEC, the court of appeals rejected  a
claim of standing  on behalf of the plaintiff, a well-known  organization  in-
terested in campaign  finance  issues.202  Common Cause alleged  that in the
1988  Senate  election  in Montana,  the Montana  Republican  Party  and the
National  Republican  Senatorial  Committee  had violated federal  campaign
election  law by  making  excessive  contributions  and  expenditures  and by
failing to accurately  report these  contributions.  The latter  claim suggested
an interest in obtaining information.  In denying standing, the court said that
the mere fact of deprivation  of knowledge as  to whether there  had been a
violation  of the law could not, by itself, create  standing;  this, according to
the court, would  be equivalent  "to recognizing  a justiciable  interest  in the
enforcement of the law.' 2 03  But if Common Cause was "asserting an inter-
est in knowing how much money a candidate  spent in an election,"  then it
would  have standing  to protect that  "legally  cognizable  injury  in fact."2 4
(This point is very much in line with the conclusion in Akins.)
Here, however, Common Cause sought investigation and the imposition
of monetary penalties, rather than disclosure itself. Thus, a central problem
for  standing  was  that the  monetary  penalties  would  not  benefit Common
Cause at all.  Concurring, Judge  Sentelle stressed this point and its connec-
tion to the problem of redressability.  In his view, the imposition of mone-
tary penalties  would only speculatively  produce future  compliance with the
law-penalties themselves would not redress any injury.205  But Judge Sen-
201  See Sunstein, supra  note  137, at 173-74  (discussing the suggestion of a historical sur-
vey that "the public action-an action brought by a private person primarily  to vindicate  the
public enforcement of public obligations-has long been a feature of our English and Ameri-
can law" (citation and internal  quotations omitted)).
202  108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
203  Id. at 418.
204  Id.
205  See id. at 419  (Sentelle,  J.,  concurring)  ("If the  injury  alleged  were  the  cognizable
deprivation of information upheld  in Akins, administrative  discipline of the alleged wrongdo-
ers would not remedy that injury.")
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telle also acknowledged that the "redressability  requirement can be satisfied
by requesting that the wrongfully withheld information be disclosed. 6
We may thus draw several  conclusions.  There  is no problem with re-
dressability if the plaintiff seeks to obtain information,  compensation for in-
formation withheld,  or (though this is less  clear) a bounty  for information
withheld.  But a problem of redressability will arise if Congress grants  citi-
zens standing to seek declaratory judgments, attorney's fees, or penalties to
be paid to the Treasury for information withheld.  If Congress wants  to al-
low standing  in cases  like Steel Co. and Common Cause, then  it  should
amend  the relevant  statutes to  provide  a financial  benefit  not only to the
Treasury, but also to the plaintiffs,  in the form,  perhaps, of fixed or sched-
uled compensation  for information withheld,  and also (or  instead)  a small
bounty for the trouble of bringing suit.  This would be easy to do.  Although
the question is not entirely settled,  a statute of this kind probably would,
2 0 7
and certainly should,2 08 be upheld.
C.  Generalized  Grievances Within the Zone?
The Akins  Court dealt with a statute that, in  its view,  unambiguously
granted standing to the plaintiffs.  But many  informational  standing  cases
involve the APA, and therefore involve ambiguity about the issue of stand-
ing.  The APA grants standing to any "person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute."209  What does this provision mean in the
context of a request for information?  Here there  is a question of statutory
interpretation;  and recall that the Akins Court suggested that there remains a
prudential  barrier to "generalized  grievance[s]."2 1 0  Thus there is  a further
question about  how prudential  barriers  are to  be understood  when  people
seek to obtain information from government or private persons.
The best way  to approach this complicated problem is  by examining a
series of cases  in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.  The  basic suggestion
in these cases  is  that if  the governing statute is ambiguous, then standing
will be denied in informational  cases where the plaintiff is one of a very
large group ofpeople.  The denial is based on prudential rather than Article
III  grounds,  and  hence  Congress  can,  in these  cases,  grant standing  if it
206 Id. at 420 (Sentelle,  J., concurring).
207  See supra  note 194 (providing statutory and case support for such a bounty system).
208  See  Sunstein, supra note  137, at  173-79,  232  (discussing the historical  support  for,
and the substantial merits of, a bounty system).
209  5  U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
210  Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 118  S. Ct.  1777, 1785 (1998).
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chooses.  The question is whether, and to what extent, this line of argument
makes sense in general or after Akins in particular.  To answer this question
it is necessary to investigate the cases in some detail.
The initial  case,  and the origin of the  doctrinal  developments,  did  not
principally  involve  informational  standing.  In Haitian Refugee Center v.
Gracey, the plaintiff organization  claimed that it had an interest in counsel-
ing and  representing  Haitians  who had  been interdicted  from entering  the
United States.211  The court concluded that this interest was not within the
zone of rights created  by the relevant laws, and therefore, that the plaintiff
lacked  standing to protect the relevant rights. 212  This  conclusion applied  to
the plaintiff's  particular  claim  that  it should have been  allowed to receive
pertinent information from the interdicted Haitians:
If any person or organization  interested in promoting  knowledge,  enjoyment,
and protection of the rights created by a statute or by a constitutional  provision
has an interest that falls within the zone protected  or regulated by the statute or
constitutional  provision,  then the zone-of-interest  test is not a test  because  it
excludes nothing.
213
The court insisted in particular that the zone of interests test should  be
read  in  the  light  of the  ban  on  standing  based  on  a "generalized  griev-
ance";21 4 if a plaintiff claiming to be  within the  zone was  a member of a
large class, then standing should be denied.  This was of course not a "pure"
information case, since it did not involve a statute that required disclosure of
information.  But it has turned out to be quite important in such cases.
In the  first  case  using  this  kind  of reasoning  to  deny  informational
standing, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to allow the Hazardous
Waste Treatment  Council to assert an unambiguous informational  injury.215
The  Council  sought to sue on the ground that regulated  third parties were
exempted  from  certain statutory  reporting  requirements  under a hazardous
waste  statute.216  The  Council claimed  that the exemption  would  make it
harder for the Council  to advance  its "educational  and promotional  activi-
,217 ties."  In denying standing, the court did not deny that there was an injury
in fact.  Instead it said that the Council's goals did not fall within the rele-
211  809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
212  See id.  at 813-16 (examining the zone of  interests that is created by the relevant laws).
213  Id. at 813.
214 Id. (citing Schlesinger  v. Reservists  Comm.  to Stop  the War, 418  U.S. 208  (1974),
and United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.  166 (1974)).
215  See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding  that a plaintiff cannot attain  standing for a generalized  grievance  simply by forming
an organization that has as its goal firtherance of the interest at the heart of the grievance).
216 See id. (summarizing the plaintiff's argument).
217  Id. at 286-87.
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vant statute's zone of interests, beyond a "general  coincidence of goals."21 8
In so concluding, the court implied that it would read the prudential barrier
in light of the additional prudential barrier that operated against generalized
grievances. 219  Thus  the  court  suggested that  the  two  prudential  barriers
would  have a kind of synergy,  preventing  members  of large  classes  from
claiming information  unless there was  a clear indication  that Congress  in-
tended them to be able to do so.
This  line of thinking was  extended  in Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Espy. 220  In that case, the Animal Legal Defense Fund and the Humane  So-
ciety  of the  United  States  challenged  the  government's  relatively  narrow
definition  of "animal"  for purposes  of the Animal  Welfare  Act.221  More
specifically,  they  complained  that  "the  exclusion of birds,  rats,  and  mice
from  the definition  of 'animal'  [would]  hamper[]  their attempts  to gather
and disseminate information on laboratory  conditions for those animals."222
A broader definition would require laboratories to provide more information
about their treatment of animals to the government, which would mean that
such information would be included in an annual report to Congress.  The
relevant organizations contended that they would use this report in "public
education  and rulemaking proceedings.' 223  In addition,  the narrow  defini-
tion of "animal"  would make it harder for the organizations  to educate the
laboratories  about "the humane treatments  of birds, rats,  and mice."224  The
Animal Legal Defense Fund thus urged that it had  standing to ensure that
the information was disclosed, especially because the information would be
central to its activities.
The court concluded that "informational  injury, without more, does not
fall  within  the  zone  of  interests  of  the  statute  under  which  suit  is
brought."22 5  The key point was that the Animal  Legal Defense Fund was
not attempting  to  promote  its members'  own legal  rights,  but "simply  to
educate  all  those  who  desire  to  promote  the  statute's  substantive  pur-
218 Id. at 287.
219  See id. (arguing that if any organization  could secure  standing by showing a general
coincidence  of goals with  a statute,  anyone  could  secure  standing  to challenge  any  action
taken by the agency implementing that statute).
220  23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994); cf Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman,  154
F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998)  (finding standing for someone claiming an aesthetic interest in ob-
servi2  animals).
See Espy, 23 F.3d at 498 (describing the plaintiffs'  grievance).
222  Id. at 501.
223  Id.
224  Id.
225  Id. at 502.
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poses."226  To have  informational standing  under the zone of interests test,
an  organization must show far more  than  a "general  corporate  purpose to
promote the interests to which the statute is addressed ....  [I]t must show a
congressional  intent to benefit the organization or some  indication that the
organization  is  'a  peculiarly  suitable  challenger  of  administrative  ne-
glect."'' 227  Here,  an  unusual  provision of the  statute  itself prohibited  any
such  showing.  The  Animal  Welfare  Act  creates  an  oversight  committee
consisting of private citizens designed to ensure compliance with the Act.22 8
In the court's view, "on the face of the Act the organizations  are not the in-
tended representatives of the public interest in animal welfare. 229
This holding is quite insecure  after Akins; it should be contrasted  with
an  important  case  in which  organizations  were  held  to  have  fulfilled  the
prudential  requirements  for  informational  standing.  In Action Alliance of
23 Senior Citizens v. Heckler,  30  the court permitted a senior citizens'  group to
challenge  regulations  that restricted  the  flow of reports  from  third parties
involving  compliance  with the Age Discrimination Act.  The Action Alli-
ance contended that these regulations would interfere with its basic mission.
The  court agreed, noting that the regulations would  make it harder for the
plaintiff organization to help  elderly people  now and to protect their  legal
interests in the future.231  In the court's view, this injury was well within the
statute's zone of interests.  The distinction between Action Alliance of Sen-
ior Citizens and Espy is thin.  The best argument would stress the existence
of a special private  institution designed to ensure compliance  with the Ani-
mal  Welfare  Act, but it  is  far from clear  that this  is  a convincing  distinc-
232 tion.
To what  extent  must an  organization  seeking  information  connect its
interest to  the substantive  purposes  of the  statute?  This  question  was not
226  Id.
227 Id. (quoting  Hazardous Waste  Treatment Council v. EPA, 861  F.2d  277,  283  (D.C.
Cir. 1988)).
228  See  7 U.S.C. § 2143  (1994) (discussing  the  "standards  and  certification  process  for
humane handling, care,  treatment, and transportation of  animals").
229  Espy, 23 F.3d at 503.
230  789 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other  grounds,  494 U.S. 1001  (1990).
231  See id. at 937-38 (identifying  added expense and difficulty as the likely results of the
restrictions on information).
232  See infra  text following note 244 (arguing that Congress's creation of a citizen review
board in conjunction  with the Animal Welfare Act does not adequately explain the preclusion
of suit by the  Animal  Legal  Defense  Fund);  see also Animal  Legal  Defense  Fund,  Inc. v.
Glickman,  154 F.3d 426,  445  (D.C. Cir.  1998)  (noting that the  Animal Welfare Act  did not
establish private citizen  committees  to oversee animal exhibitions,  but "anticipated  the  con-
tinued  monitoring  of concerned  animal lovers to  ensure that  the purposes  of the Act were
honored").
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pressed in the cases just discussed,  all of which involved a close connection
between the  plaintiff's  interests  and  the  statute's basic  concerns.  In the
leading case,  Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration,"' two organizations, the Competitive  Enterprise  In-
stitute and Consumer Alert, brought suit to challenge the National Highway
Traffic  Safety  Administration's  ("NHTSA")  decisions  that  lowered  the
minimum Corporate  Average  Fuel  Economy  ("CAFE")  standards  for  pas-
senger cars.  Both organizations complained of NHTSA's failure to produce
an EIS discussing the adverse safety  effects of the CAFE standards.  They
argued that the absence of such a statement made  it harder  for them to ob-
tain and disseminate information that was central to their organizational ac-
tivities.  In the abstract, their complaint had a high degree of plausibility  in-
sofar as  fuel economy standards  may have  adverse safety effects-a point
that, it is  reasonable to think, deserves public  attention when an  agency  is
deciding how much to require in the way of fuel economy.234
The court held that an informational injury  would be a legitimate  basis
for federal jurisdiction when the information is  "essential  to the injured or-
ganization's  activities"  and  when "the  lack of the information  will  render
those activities infeasible."235  To meet this standard, the organization "must
assert a plausible link between the agency's action, the informational  injury,
,,236 and  the  organization's  activities.  The  court,  however,  held  that  the
plaintiff organizations  did not have standing  under this test to contest the
agency's failure to provide an EIS.  This was because there was no showing
of  "how  the  lack  of  that  assessment  from  NHTSA  ha[d]  significantly
harmed  their  ability  to  educate  and  inform  the  public  about  highway
safety.' 237  The  court  acknowledged  that, under  previous  cases,238  NEPA
had been held to have created a right to information about the environmental
effects of government  action, and that a denial of that information "consti-
233  901 F.2d  107 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
234  See John D. Graham, Saving Gasoline and  Lives, in RISK VERSUS  RISK:  TRADEOFFS
IN  PROTECTING  HEALTH  AND THE ENvIRONMENT  87,  98-102 (John D. Graham  & Jonathan
Baert Wiener eds.,  1995) (discussing the important role of the Insurance  Institute for Highway
Safety  in bringing  the safety  risks associated  with  stricter CAFE  standards  into the public
policy debate).
235  Competitive Enter.  Inst., 901 F.2d at 122.
236  Id.
237  Id. at 123.
238  See National  Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839  F.2d 694, 712  (D.C. Cir. 1988)  (finding
that the "elimination of the opportunity to see and use an EIS prepared under federal law does
constitute  a constitutionally  sufficient  injury on which to ground standing"),  rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. National  Wildlife  Fed'n v. Lujan,  928 F.2d  453  (D.C.  Cir.  1991);  Scien-
tists'  Inst. for Pub. Info.  v. Atomic  Energy  Comm'n, 481  F.2d  1079,  1091  (D.C. Cir.  1973)
(finding that NEPA requires EISs for technology development programs).
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tutes  a constitutionally  cognizable  injury, without further inquiry into cau-
sation  or redressability." 239  In such  cases, however, it would be necessary
to show that the  information  sought involved a specifically environmental
harm;  "there is a critical difference  between seeking an EIS  for the purpose
of disseminating  information about potential  environmental harm and seek-
ing  an  EIS  as  a vehicle  for obtaining  or disseminating  information  on  a
nonenvironmental  issue., 240  The court emphasized  that the plaintiffs,  who
did  not invoke  environmental  concerns,  were  not within NEPA's  zone  of
interests,  which  involved  strictly  environmental  consequences  of govern-
ment action.241
With respect to the  application of prudential requirements  to informa-
tional actions, the lower court rulings  thus reflect considerable  complexity.
But three propositions seem to underlie the rulings, and we can organize the
law in the following way.  First: An organization  may sue to obtain infor-
mation when that information is important to protect  its members'  (nonin-
formational)  statutory legal  rights, at least if the injury is not widely gener-
alized.  This premise is the basic point of Action Alliance of  Senior  Citizens.
Second:  When an organization seeks information and when its interests are
very widely shared, the courts will deny standing on prudential grounds,  ap-
parently even if the information is  important to the organization's  mission.
Third:  Under NEPA (designed to safeguard environmental goals) and other
statutes  designed  to  protect  interests that  are not purely  informational,  an
organization  can  bring suit to require  an EIS or  otherwise to  obtain infor-
mation  essential to its activities  if  the reason for  bringing suit is to protect
interests  that  are  specifically  environmental  or otherwise  in  line  with the
statute's  substantive  goals.  This  third proposition,  however,  is  subject  to
qualification  from  the second.  With  suitable amendments,  these  proposi-
tions appear to apply to individuals as well.
Akins does not say a great deal either to undermine or to support these
conclusions-Akins  suggests only (what the lower court cases do not deny)
that Congress  can grant purely  informational  standing if it chooses.  If the
lower court cases remain good law, then most of the doctrinal  work in chal-
lenging attempts to bring suit for information will be prudential.  Courts will
ask (1) whether the plaintiff falls within  the statute's zone of interests;  (2)
whether the plaintiff is part of a very large class;  and (3) whether the infor-
mation is relevant to the organization's activities  in protecting  independent
legal interests (for example, the interest in environmental  quality or freedom
239  Competitive Enter. Inst., 901 F.2d at 123.
240  Id.
241  See id. (stressing that standing under NEPA has only been granted when the plaintiffs'
interests relate to environmental  interests protected by NEPA).
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from  age discrimination).  It  is relevant  in this regard  whether the zone of
interests test is generally meant to be strict or lenient; the Court's most re-
cent pronouncement  in National Credit Union Administration v. First  Na-
tional Bank & Trust Co.,242 suggests  great leniency, in line  with the basic
thrust of other Supreme Court decisions.
243
For those who believe,  as Akins itself suggests, that the key standing is-
sue is whether Congress  has authorized the suit, the problem  in all of these
cases is simple to pose:  Is this the kind of plaintiff whose interests are safe-
guarded by the legal provision  at issue?  If this is the proper question, then
perhaps standing should have been allowed  in all  of the cases above, with
the  exception  of Competitive Enterprise Institute, in  which the  plaintiffs'
complaint lay far outside the domain of statutory  concerns.  Thus, there is
reason to think that some or many of the lower court cases should not sur-
vive Akins.
Consider, for example, the Animal  Welfare Act.  If an ordinary citizen
concerned with animal welfare sought to require  the regulations  at issue  in
Espy, a response might be that the ordinary citizen should not be allowed to
sue unless she can show a distinctive personal or professional interest in the
protection  of animals  or in the  use of the relevant information;  otherwise,
the case would  seem to  involve an interest  in law enforcement for its  own
sake.  Espy itself, however, was quite different.  The Animal Legal Defense
Fund  had  a special  and  particularized  interest  in the relevant  information
and in disseminating it, as a way of protecting the legal rights protected  by
the Animal  Welfare Act.  Thus, the Animal  Legal Defense Fund was well
within the statute's zone of interests and had no widely generalized injury.
The  best justification for the  lower court's conclusion  in Espy is that
Congress  implicitly precluded  the suit by creating  a citizen review  board.
This would  suggest that the outcome  was a narrow one,  based on the dis-
tinctive structure of the Animal  Welfare Act.  Perhaps one could argue not
242  118 S.  CL 927, 938  (1998)  (finding that the "interest [of competing financial  institu-
tions] in limiting the markets that [federal] credit unions can serve" is within the statute's zone
of interests); see also Animal Legal Defense  Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 444 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (stating that "the zone of interests test is generous and relatively undemanding").
243  See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396 (1987) (finding that the trade
association has standing because  its interests are "arguably  within the zone of interests to be
protected");  Association  of Data  Processing  Serv. Orgs.,  Inc. v. Camp,  397  U.S.  150,  154
(1970)  (noting that "the  trend is toward enlargement of the class  of  people who may protest
administrative action").  But see Air Courier Conf. v. American Postal Workers Union,  498
U.S. 517, 517-18  (1991)  (arguing that the union's interests were outside  the zone of interests
because the  monopoly  statute's  purpose  was  to give an  economic  advantage  to the  Postal
Service  and not to  protect postal jobs,  and,  therefore,  holding that postal  workers  have  no
standing  to challenge the Service's  decision  to allow competition  in international  remailing
services despite its statutory monopoly).
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that there  was  a prudential  barrier to  standing,  but instead,  that Congress
implicitly had prohibited the suit.  Such an argument is analogous to the rea-
soning of Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, in which the Court denied
standing  on similar grounds.244  If the creation  of the review  board did  in
fact represent a decision not to allow private supervision in the form of suits
by people  within the zone of interests, a denial of standing would be  per-
fectly  appropriate.  As a matter of statutory interpretation, however, this ar-
gument is fragile.  Why should we view the review board and the courtroom
as  competing  rather than  complementary?  Since the  plaintiffs  had  a dis-
tinctive organizational  interest  in the relevant  information,  standing should
have been granted.
The  analysis  would  be  similar  with  respect  to  informational  standing
under NEPA.  Note first that in the ordinary NEPA case, the plaintiff seeks
not information but  a delay  in the completion  of a project until an EIS is
produced;  hence,  the plaintiff must show, as  a matter of interpretation  of
NEPA,  that  he has  a  distinctive  stake,  usually  environmental,  in  the  ac-
tion.245  For example, a citizen of Wyoming who complains about the failure
to  compile  an EIS  about  a development  in New York must show that the
development would in some way affect his aesthetic,  recreational,  or mate-
rial interests.  This citizen should ordinarily be denied standing because no
interest  protected  by  NEPA supports  his  action.  But  a question  remains.
After Akins,  might the citizen of Wyoming contend, not that he sought an
EIS to protect his environmental  interests in New York, but that he sought
an EIS in order to receive information about important issues bearing on his
duties and activities as a voter?
The  best answer  is that the citizen of Wyoming  could not so  contend.
The mere  fact that the relevant EIS would produce  information of personal
or professional  interest is not enough-not, it must be added, as a matter of
Article  III,  but as a  reading  of congressional  instructions  and concerns  in
244  467 U.S. 340, 348  (1984)  (holding that consumers  may not obtain judicial  review of
milk market orders under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act because the Act does not
contemplate such suits).
245  See Sierra  Club v. Morton,  405  U.S. 727  (1972)  (holding  that the petitioner lacked
standing because it failed to show "individualized  harm to itself or its members").  According
to this view, the holding in Sierra Club is largely an interpretation of NEPA.  There  is no  in-
jury in fact because NEPA created  no legal interest!  If this formulation  seems odd, consider
its similarity to the analysis in Akins.  Akins had an injury in fact because he had a legal inter-
est.  Extending this analysis, Sierra  Club is very  similar to United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S.  166 (1974),  in which the Court held that the taxpayer did not have standing because he
failed to  show an  injury or  immediate  danger of legally cognizable  injury.  In both  cases,
standing was denied because the relevant provision of law did not create individual rights.
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246 enacting NEPA.  It is here that the zone of interests test and the prudential
barrier to generalized grievances meet-not as inferences from Article III or
even the APA, but as  a somewhat crude  and indirect way of getting at the
key question, which relates to the text and purposes of the statute pursuant
to which the plaintiff initiates suit.  Thus, the appropriate  conclusion is that
when a court denies standing  to a plaintiff  on the ground  that its interest is
both highly generalized  and not within the zone of statutory interests, it is
really saying that the underlying statute is best read not to allow suits by
plaintiffs of  that sort. As we have seen, this is the best defense of the "in-
jury in fact" and "redressability"  standards as well.  And the best defense of
the lower court cases denying standing on this rationale is that when the in-
jury is  highly generalized,  there  should be a presumption  against standing
on the ground that such injuries are best redressed politically.  Congress can
overcome that presumption if it chooses to do so.
D. Illustrations
With these  basic conclusions,  we can  assess a series of stylized  cases,
drawing on the discussion thus far.
IA.  A group  of workers  in a plant  in Detroit brings  suit against the
plant  for  failing to  disclose  workplace  risks.  They seek  full  information
about those risks, as is required (in their view) by the governing  law.  This
is an easy  case.  Standing should be granted, even in the absence of an ex-
plicit statute  authorizing  standing.  The  plaintiffs  have shown  both injury
(nondisclosure  of information  undoubtedly  relevant to  them)  and redress-
ability, and no problem exists under the prudential requirements.
lB.  Cereal  consumers  bring suit against General  Cereal  for false and
incomplete statements  involving the nutritional content of food.  They seek
full  disclosure  and  compensatory  damages.  Standing  should be  granted,
even  in the absence of an explicit statute.  The case is slightly harder,  but
basically the same  as case  IA.  The strongest argument  against standing is
that the class of plaintiffs is very large and, hence, that the grievance is gen-
246  If Congress  allowed anyone to bring suit to require compliance with NEPA-not be-
cause of any specifically  environmental  interests but because of a general  interest in the in-
formation at stake--there would probably be no Article III issue.  The strongest opposing ar-
gument  would  be  that  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  distinctly  environmental  interest  in  the
backdrop, as in a case in which people located near a proposed causeway challenge the failure
to prepare an EIS.  As NEPA now stands,  an environmental  interest is  indeed a requirement,
and this view  is  best justified  as a reading of NEPA itself, perhaps  informed by prudential
considerations.
1999]668  UNIVERSITY OF  PENNSYLVANIA  LAW REVIEW
eralized,  triggering  a  prudential  barrier  against  standing.  But  since  the
plaintiffs are unambiguously within the relevant zone of interests, and since
the difference  from  case  IA is only one of degree, standing is available un-
der Akins.  The class of plaintiffs is not so extremely large  as to trigger any
prudential barriers.
IC.  Television viewers  bring  suit against the American  Broadcasting
Company  ("ABC"),  complaining that ABC has  failed to  rate its programs
adequately  and thus failed  to comply with  the Telecommunications  Act  of
1996.  As in example 1  B, the strongest argument against standing is that the
grievance  is widely generalized and, hence,  that standing  should be denied
on  prudential  grounds.  If the  plaintiffs  consist  of television  viewers  as
such-which  is  to  say  the  vast  majority  of Americans-standing  should
probably be denied for that reason.  The case would be different if brought
by parents of school age children, a more limited group whose members fall
squarely within  the zone of interests  protected by the Telecommunications
Act.  The  case would also  be different if the plaintiff was an organization
particularly interested in the content of television programming;  in that case,
it would closely resemble  lB,  and standing should be granted.
2A.  A  group  of citizens  in New York and Connecticut  complains  to
OSHA that firms  in Illinois  have not been required to  disclose  workplace
risks.  In the face  of OSHA  inaction, the citizens  in New York  and Con-
necticut bring suit, contending that the information would help them in their
capacity as citizens; if they learn about workplace risks, then they will know
more about how to vote and about what political  activities  would be most
worthwhile. Standing should be denied.  The plaintiffs do not fall within the
zone of interests protected by the Occupational  Safety and Health Act.
2B.  Citizens for Safe Workplaces  ("CSW"), a Washington, DC organi-
zation,  brings  suit against  OSHA,  contending that  it has failed  to require
disclosure of workplace risks in Detroit.  CSW has no members  in Detroit,
but  its  members  include  many  people  interested  in  promoting  workplace
safety and workers in various states.  CSW seeks disclosure of the informa-
tion on the ground that CSW could use that information  in its various  edu-
cational and political activities.  This  is a hard standing  case.  The best ar-
gument  against  CSW  is  that  CSW  does not  include  Detroit workers  and
therefore  is not within the zone of interests protected by the statute, a con-
clusion that could be fortified by invoking the prudential barrier to general-
ized grievances.  Because CSW would use the information in activities di-
rectly related to workplace  safety, however, it stands out from the public at
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large, and CSW should be permitted to bring suit.  This conclusion is  con-
sistent with the analysis of NEPA in Competitive Enterprise  Institute. 247
3.  Citizens for a Nuclear-Free Environment,  an environmental  organi-
zation based in California,  attacks the adequacy of an EIS produced in con-
nection with  a nuclear  power plant to be built in Massachusetts.  The  or-
ganization contends that an adequate statement would be extremely  helpful
in its political and educational  activities.  This is also  a hard  standing case,
and it would be reasonable to deny standing on the ground that the interest
is  highly  generalized and  that only  those  in Massachusetts,  with environ-
mental  interests  at stake, should be permitted  to bring  suit.  Probably the
better conclusion, however, is that informational standing should be granted
on the theory that the plaintiffs  are  well within the zone  of interests  pro-
tected  by  NEPA;  Competitive Enterprise Institute  supports  this  conclu-
sion.
248
4.  Consumers  in Los Angeles challenge a Los Angeles water supplier's
failure to provide adequate information about its performance  in connection
with the Safe Water Drinking Amendments of 1996.249  They seek the rele-
vant information,  which they  contend is  relevant to their behavior as  con-
sumers of water in the local area.  This is an easy standing case; it is akin to
case 1A above.
5A.  A  reporter  for  The  Washington Post brings  suit  against the De-
partment  of Health  and  Human  Services,  complaining  that  his  work has
been hindered by the government's unlawful failure to require disclosure of
certain practices  under the Medicaid statute.  The plaintiff contends that the
relevant information would be extremely valuable in his professional  activi-
ties.  Standing should probably  be denied on the ground  that reporters  are
not within the zone of interests protected by the Medicaid statute.
5B.  The  Gray Panthers,  a group  dedicated  to  the welfare  of elderly
people, brings the same suit as in 5A, contending that it needs the informa-
247  See 901 F.2d  107, 122-24  (noting that, even under the more liberal  standing require-
ments  used in NEPA-related  cases, a "right to specific  information  under NEPA has so far
been recognized for standing  purposes  only when the information  sought relates  to environ-
mental interests that NEPA was intended to protect").
248  See id. at 122 (stating that standing is granted to those who have suffered "[an]  injury
to an interest within the zone of interest protected by [NEPA]").
249  42 U.S.C. § 300j-21  (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (outlining additional requirements to Ti-
te XIV of the Public Health Service Act, regulating drinking water).
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tion in order to perform its various  public interest activities  and in order to
promote the well-being of its members.  Standing should be granted because
the  injury  is  not  so  highly  generalized,  and  because  the  group  contains
members  who are unambiguously  within the zone of interests protected  by
the statute.
5C.  A  daughter  of an  elderly  woman  receiving  Medicaid  brings the
same suit as in 5A,  contending that she would like to see the relevant infor-
mation in order to ensure that her mother is being treated in accordance with
the law.  This is a very hard case.  On the one hand, the interests at stake are
those of a beneficiary of the Medicaid program, and the child of a benefici-
ary has a distinct and not merely ideological interest in the problem.  On the
other hand, the beneficiary of the program  is not the plaintiff (compare with
5B) and a large number of people might reasonably claim that they are  in-
terested,  financially  or otherwise,  in the  legality  of the government's  be-
havior under the Medicaid statute.  Clearly, Congress  could grant standing
in this case if it chose to do so, but if  there is no express grant, then standing
should probably be denied on the ground that the case is somewhat closer to
5A than to 5B.
E.  The Implications of  Informational  Standing  for  Noninformational
Standing: A BriefNote
How does all this bear on standing in general?  Several important points
are  clear.  So  long  as  there  is  an injury,  Congress  can  grant standing  to
plaintiffs even if their injuries are very widely shared.  Whether there is an
injury depends largely  on what the law says.  In addition, whether the case
involves  information or  something  else,  there is no redressability  problem
even if an agency, having lost on the legal question at issue, might have dis-
cretion to do what it originally  did on some other ground.  Thus a majority
of the Court has repudiated the plurality opinion in Lujan insofar as it con-
cluded that there would be a serious problem with redressability.2 5
The most  interesting  questions  involve  Congress's  authority  to  create
novel  legal  interests  and to  give people the power to  bring suit to protect
those interests in court.  Congress might, for example,  give everyone  an in-
terest in information of a certain sort (as it did in both FOIA and FECA, and
might do in other contexts as well); Akins plainly says that this is  constitu-
tional.  If Congress  can do that, perhaps  it also has a great deal of room to
250  See Lujan  v.  Defenders of Wildlife,  504  U.S. 555,  568-71  (1992)  (noting that  the
plaintiffs, in challenging  a "generalized  level of government action,"  failed to present a case
for the redressability  of their specific injuries in fact).
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create  novel interests  that  do  not involve  information.  Perhaps  Congress
could give all citizens  a property  interest  in the continued existence of en-
dangered species (making each of us beneficial owners of a particular sort),
or in maintaining certain land in a pristine state, or in clean air in certain re-
gions of the  country,  or  in a certain  kind  of telecommunications  market.
AfterAkins, why is Congress forbidden from saying that all Americans have
a property interest in clear skies  above the Grand Canyon, a property inter-
est that exists regardless of whether the citizens in question actually visit the
Grand Canyon?2 51
A possible answer-not ruled out by current law-is that such a statute
would be unconstitutional because those who do not visit the Grand Canyon
lack an "injury in fact.' 252  The same might be said about the hypothesized
cases involving endangered species,  land,  and telecommunications.  But if
Congress says that they have an injury in fact, why should courts disagree?
Note that "existence value" is often treated as a kind of property interest for
purposes of environmental valuation;253 it is now conventional  in contingent
valuation  studies to consider  the amount that people  are willing  to pay  in
order to maintain a certain state of affairs.  This very practice treats the con-
tinued existence of that state of affairs as  a kind of property interest.  Why
can't Congress do the same thing?  In any case, a property interest often is
no more, and no less, than a cause of action.  If Congress  attempts to create
a cause of action in a certain state of affairs and grants that cause of action
to  all Americans,  there  appears  to  be no  constitutional  barrier,  especially
after the Akins Court's unambiguous holding that the obstacle to generalized
grievances is merely prudential.
Justice  Kennedy  presaged this judgment with  his  cautionary  notes  in
Lujan, quoted as the first epigraph to this Article:  "Congress  has the power
to define injuries  and articulate chains  of causation that will give rise to a
case  or controversy where none existed before." 254  Justice Kennedy joined
the Lujan opinion  only because  in creating  citizen standing  under the En-
251  People are  often  willing to pay  a good deal  for the "existence"  of certain environ-
mental amenities,  and that existence value often plays  a role in contingent valuation studies.
See  DAvID W. PEARCE &  R.  KERRY  TURNER,  EcoNoMIcs  OF NATURAL  RESOURCES  AND
THE ENviRONMENT  137-40 (1990).
252  Cf Lujan,  504  U.S.  at  560  ("Mhe  plaintiff must  have  suffered  an  'injury  in
fact'  ...  which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)  'actual  or imminent ...'  (citations
omitted)); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)  (holding that the  Sierra Club had
failed to demonstrate  how any of its members would be affected  by the challenged  develop-
ment).
2  See supra  note 251; see also Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432,
464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding contingent valuation that allows use of"existence value" and
"option value").
254 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580.
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dangered Species Act, Congress failed to "identify the injury it seeks to vin-
dicate and relate the injury to the class of persons  entitled to bring suit."255
FECA is quite different on this count.  Congress  clearly identified the rele-
vant  interest, which was unambiguously  related to the grant of standing to
citizens.  Thus, Akins vindicates  Justice  Kennedy's  point and his  concern
about the breadth of Lujan insofar as it shows that Congress may recognize
an  entirely new  (and highly  generalized)  legal interest,  one foreign  to the
common  law,  and  give  all  citizens  standing  to  vindicate  that  interest  in
court.  After Akins, whether a deprivation of information counts as an injury
(in fact!)  depends on whether it is (alleged to be) against the law.  And after
Akins, it does not matter if that injury  is shared by most or all citizens-at
least to the extent that Congress says this does not matter.
If this is true with information,  why is it not true with many other inter-
ests?  Why, for example,  is  Congress not permitted to give standing to  all
drivers  to challenge acts that increase the risk of accidents  on highways;2 56
or to give standing to parents of children in schools undergoing desegrega-
tion plans to allow them to challenge the grant of tax deductions to segre-
gated schools; 257 or to give standing to automobile  purchasers  and environ-
mental organizations to ensure that the EPA enforces statutory requirements
for fuel economy standards?258  The best answer is that Congress is  indeed
permitted to do these things.259  To the extent that similar cases have come
out unfavorably to plaintiffs,  it is because the governing statutes, interpreted
in the light of relevant prudential requirements, reflect no effort by Congress
to  do so.  Akins would not have had  standing if Congress  had denied  him
standing.  Because of the prudential barrier to generalized grievances, Akins
would probably not have had standing if FECA had merely incorporated the
APA's standing provision.  Denials of standing in cases involving novel in-
terests  foreign to the existing legal  culture  are therefore  best understood  as
interpretations  of the underlying  statute.  Congress's  challenge  for the fu-
ture-if it genuinely  seeks  to  grant standing-is  to  think  of imaginative
255  Id.
256  See International  Bd. of Teamsters  v. Pefia,  17 F.3d  1478,  1483-87 (D.C. Cir.  1994)
(holding that the union had standing to challenge the Memorandum of Understanding between
the United States and Mexico regarding recognition of foreign commercial drivers'  licenses).
257 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 (1984) (holding that parents seeking relief for
the IRS's  failure  to  fulfill  its  obligation  to deny  tax  exempt  status  on  racially  segregated
schools failed to demonstrate ajudicially cognizable injury).
258  See supra  note 140 and accompanying text.
259 See  Animal  Legal  Defense  Fund,  Inc. v.  Glickman,  154  F.3d 426,  445  (D.C.  Cir.
1998) (recognizing an aesthetic interest in observing animals).
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ways to create legal interests in the rights it intends to protect.  26  With this
point, we end where we began:  an assertion of the primacy, for purposes of
Article III, of legislative instructions.
CONCLUSION
In this Article,  I have attempted  to outline the range  of statutes that at-
tempt to use information as a regulatory  tool; to understand their rationale,
their potential  value,  and their potential  pathologies;  to  see when  citizens
are,  and should  be,  granted  standing to  obtain information;  and to under-
stand how all these points  bear on the general  law of standing.  We have
seen that American  government  frequently,  and increasingly,  avoids  both
market and command-and-control solutions  by using information disclosure
as a regulatory tool.  Sometimes informational strategies attempt to improve
the ordinary operations of markets by ensuring that workers  and consumers
are  adequately  informed.  Initiatives  involving tobacco  products,  the nutri-
tional  content of food and drink, and worker safety are  primary examples.
Sometimes  information  is required as part of moral  suasion and in order to
trigger political safeguards.  EPCRA and FECA are the chief examples here.
Typically information,  once provided to one or a few, is also provided
to many or all; and very frequently information is required  as a way of pro-
tecting  against a widely  shared  injury.  In the  political context,  the injury
from nondisclosure  may be suffered by a large number of citizens.  After
Akins, this  is not an  obstacle to standing,  and properly so-assuming that
Congress  has concluded that it ought not be.  Nothing in the Constitution
forbids Congress from authorizing  groups of citizens to bring suit to obtain
information  that they believe  is  relevant to  their interests.  Nor does  any-
thing in the Constitution forbid Congress from granting citizens a legal right
to  information  and  allowing  them  to  vindicate  that  right  in  court.  This
holding-a  crucial  part of Akins-is  a  vindication  of Justice  Kennedy's
highly suggestive concurring  opinion in Lujan, allowing Congress to create
injuries quite foreign to the common law.
Things are more complicated with respect to redressability.  In Akins it-
self, the injury-a lack of information-would have been redressed by a fa-
260  Examples are briefly given above  involving endangered species and visibility.  More
particularly, Congress might say, for example,  that Americans have a shared property interest
in the continued existence of endangered species,  an interest that is violated whenever the fed-
eral  government  acts unlawfiully  under the Endangered  Species  Act,  16 U.S.C.  §§  1531-34
(1994),  and an interest that can be protected by citizen  suits.  A statute of this kind might be
strengthened by reference to the role of "existence value" in ordinary  cases of environmental
valuation.  I do not suggest that Congress  should do this  as a matter of policy; the answer to
that question depends on context.
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vorable  decree.  The information itself need not have been linked to any in-
dependent  interest.  Nor was  it important  that the  FEC  might  ultimately
have exercised its  discretion unfavorably to the plaintiffs.  This conclusion
offers an  important  lesson about  the nature of procedural  injuries:  proce-
dures  are  designed  to  structure  decisions  and to  create  incentives,  not to
command particular outcomes,  and an injury  to a procedural  interest need
not be tied to  a nonspeculative  outcome.  It follows that courts  should be
careful  and  self-conscious  about  characterizing  the  injury  of which  the
plaintiff complains.  I suggest that Akins may be the first step toward a more
explicit confrontation, on the Court's part, with that important question.
What about the prudential  limitations?  When Congress  has not explic-
itly granted standing to those who seek information, it is important to know
what the relevant law says.  In many cases involving informational standing,
there is no difficult question about whether the plaintiffs fall within the zone
of interests protected by the statute. It is possible, however, to imagine cases
in which those who seek  information are  attempting to vindicate  interests,
economic or ideological, that have little to do with the statute's substantive
goals.  In such cases, the prudential  limits on standing are properly invoked
and the plaintiffs should be held to be outside the zone of statutory  interests.
Furthermore, if the plaintiff is a member of a large group, or is hard to dis-
tinguish from other citizens generally, the argument for invoking prudential
barriers is strengthened.  We have examined a range of possible cases to see
how this analysis might work.  The simplest point is that if an injury is very
widely shared, then there is reason to deny standing if the case is, with re-
spect to the zone of interests test, otherwise in equipoise.
Beyond these  doctrinal points, the Akins decision deserves a more gen-
eral  celebration.  It  is  the  first  case  in  a  long  while to  place the  law  of
standing on a solid foundation-an understanding of the particular statutory
and constitutional provisions that are said to give rise to a legally cognizable
injury.  But there  is a more particular point, involving the relationship of in-
formation  to regulatory  law.  In  the  same  period  in which  the American
economy  increasingly has become based on the production and exchange of
information,  American  government  has  increasingly  attempted  to  control
public and  private  conduct-not  via command-and-control  regulation,  but
by requiring disclosure of information.  And in the same period in which in-
formational regulation has become a hallmark of American government,  in-
formational  standing has increasingly  emerged  as  a central problem  in ad-
ministrative  law.  There  is  nothing  constitutionally  problematic  about  a
congressional judgment that  a deprivation  of information  counts as  legally
cognizable  injury.  The question  is whether  Congress  has made that judg-
ment.  In the area of informational standing, as in the law of standing gener-
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ally, the relevant statutory law is the best place to start, rooting the doctrine
in democratic  rather  than judicial judgments  about the appropriate  nature,
and boundaries, of modem regulatory government.*  *  *  *  *  *